

COUNTERINSURGENCY IN WEST AFRICA:
NON LETHAL ACTIVITIES

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ABSTRACT

COUNTERINSURGENCY IN WEST AFRICA: NON LETHAL ACTIVITIES, by
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Among the most challenging issues of West Africa, is its security. This region had experienced and is still experiencing many insurgencies. The Senegalese Armed Forces had been containing the insurgents in Senegal's southern Casamance region for more than twenty years. They have conducted many successful military operations against the rebels but still now the region is not completely secured. Despite this long insurgency, the Republic of Senegal seems more fortunate than some of its neighbors in West Africa, such as Liberia or Côte d'Ivoire. In these two countries, the insurgency reached such high levels that United Nations peacekeeping forces' interventions were required to avoid a general chaos in those countries.

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ACRONYMS

AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AU	African Union
BDK	Bloc Democratique de Kedougou
BDS	Bloc Democratique Senegalais
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CRC-NPFL	Central Revolutionary Council
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program(s)
DIME	Diplomacy, Informational, Military and Economy
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FLGO	Forces de Libération du Grand Ouest (Côte d’Ivoire)
FM	Field Manual
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICGL	International Contact Group on Liberia
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IECOM	Independent Elections Commission
IGNU	Interim Government of National Unity
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INEC	Independent National Elections Commission
INPFL	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia

IO	Information Operation
LAC	Liberia Agriculture Company
LDF	Lofa Defense Force
LLF	Liberian Frontier Force
LLO	Logical Line of Operation
LMP	Lineage mode of production
LNTG	Liberia National Transitional Government
LPC	Liberia Peace Council,
LPP	Liberia People's Party
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Development
MFDC	Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance
MILOCI	Mouvement Ivoirien pour la Libération de l'Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire
MJP	Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (Côte d'Ivoire)
MINUCI	United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MPCI	Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire
MPIGO	Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest
MRU	Mano River Union
NDPL	National Democratic Party of Liberia
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPP	National Patriotic Party
OAU	Organization of African Unity (current AU)
PDCI-RDA	Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire - Rassemblement Démocratique Africain

PDS	Parti Democratique Senegalais
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PMAD	Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense
PRC	People's Redemption Council
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
PS	Parti Socialiste
RUF	Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SWAC	Sahel and West Africa Club
TWP	True Whig Party
UGOVAF	Union Générale des Originaires de la Vallée du Fleuve
ULIMO	United Liberation movement of Liberia
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement of Liberia
ULIMO-J	United Liberation Movement of Liberia-Johnson
ULIMO-K	United Liberation Movement of Liberia-Kromah
UN	United Nations
UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UPLTCI	Union des Patriotes pour la Libération Totale de la Côte d'Ivoire
U.S.	United States of America

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Among the biggest issues of West Africa, is its security. This region has experienced and is still experiencing many insurgencies. Coups d'états are very frequent. Mauritania and Guinea are ruled now by military juntas. Nigeria is experiencing a series of bloody religious conflicts. Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire are trying to find stability with the assistance of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces. Senegal, Mali and Niger are struggling with insurgents. The political, military, economic, social and physical environments are highly conducive for the creation of insurgencies.



Figure 1. Map of West Africa

Source: United Nations, Map No. 4242, February 2006.

Most of West African countries are emerging democracies. The political climate is known to be *neopatrimonial*. Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel define *neopatrimonialism* as “a type of political domination which is characterized by insecurity about the behavior and role of state institutions (and agents)”.¹ Most of the presidents have come to power by coups d'états or contested elections. The security forces in West Africa do not have enough resources to properly conduct crowd control. This has led them to use excessive force in dealing with public demonstrations. Such tactics have made it easier for the insurgents to win the population over to their side.

The economic climate in West Africa is disastrous. The sixteen (16) countries of West Africa are among the poorest of the world. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of more than 50 countries in the world exceed U.S. \$20,000, while, with the exception of Cape Verde with a GDP per capita of \$3,200, West African countries' GDP per capita do not exceed \$2,000. In addition, the unemployment rate is extremely high: 85 percent in Liberia, 77 percent in Burkina Faso, 48 percent in Senegal, and is thought to be similar in most other West African countries, although statistics are not available.² These economic conditions are favorable for the recruitment of people to join an insurgency.

The population in West Africa is characterized by its diversity. Each country has many ethnic groups. The artificial borders established by colonization do not reflect the ethnic or cultural boundaries. Therefore, insurgents can easily find support across borders. This diversity also facilitates ethnic and religious grievances.

Governments of West African countries rely on their natural resources as their main source of revenue. The illegal trade of natural resources is the spark of many of the insurgencies. Moreover, the movement of the populations, regardless of their country of origin, to exploit these resources, creates xenophobia and causes ethnic conflicts.

To solve their security dilemma, most West African countries have been using a very heavy handed approach which has not been successful. In the absence of conventional warfare, the governments have failed to appropriately use their armed forces to serve the people. Instead, these nations' armed forces are usually used to satisfy the greed of the governments and the warlords.

A *non lethal* approach of controlling insurgencies has been adopted in several instances, but mostly after the failure of the government to contain the insurgents with conventional security forces. *Lethality* here deals with the use of armed violence to neutralize the insurgency. Because of the late use of non lethal means, the conflict usually escalates, and the government is unable to defuse the insurgency. Nevertheless, the use of non lethal means has been quite successful in bringing back peace, but not a decisive and long lasting peace. These non lethal means consist of all the diplomatic, economic, political and social elements that can help to bring back a stable and peaceful environment. West Africa has effectively used its major sub-regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in a multinational approach to deal with the insurgents. The insurgents and the governments mostly reached agreements thanks to the mediation of a third party.

The U.S. Army Counterinsurgency (COIN) Field Manual, FM 3-24, defines an *insurgency* as an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. *Counterinsurgency* is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.³ The complexity of counterinsurgency is highlighted in the same manual by its paradoxes:

Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be;
Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is;
The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and the more risk must be accepted;
Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction;
Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot;
If a tactic works this week, it might not work next week; if it works in this province, it might not work in the next;
Tactical success guarantees nothing;
Many important decisions are not made by generals.⁴

The lessons learned from COIN history show that a lethal and heavy handed strategy is not very efficient and moreover can worsen the situation. A classic example of a heavy handed approach in COIN is the French in Algeria. They adopted an overly militarized strategy that allowed them to have tactical success, but failed to defeat the insurgency.⁵ The *Britain's Longest War* is a good example of recent success in COIN. The British started with heavy handed approach to defeat the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA).⁶ When they realized that the Northern Ireland government was pro-protestant and anti-Catholic, they dissolved it, but it was too late.⁷ They adopted the internment strategy which allowed them to disrupt PIRA's structure, but caused a bad image of the British internationally.⁸ Even though the British prime minister said publicly

that they “do not negotiate with terrorists”, they did negotiate a lot with the insurgents. They even empowered the leadership to maintain an influential party to negotiate with. This is contrary to the Israeli strategy which aimed to destroy the Palestinian leadership.⁹ The Israeli Defense forces, as the French in Algeria, had tactical success but cannot still defeat the insurgents. Having adopted a deterrence strategy for the whole region since the conventional wars against its neighboring Arabic countries, Israel is not willing to target the “hearts and minds” of the Palestinians. But by killing more Palestinians, they are creating more frustration, and therefore more insurgents.¹⁰ “Winning the hearts and minds of the population” appeared for the first time with the British successful COIN operation in Malaya.¹¹ The British shifted from “search and destroy” to severing the popular support critical to an insurgency.

The Americans adopted a reverse strategy in the Philippines. They started with the “policy of attraction” to win the hearts and minds of the population, and ended to heavy handed strategy, using local forces. Nevertheless, the COIN campaign was successful.

The ongoing operation in Afghanistan started with lot of mistakes.¹² For example, operation “Mountain Sweep” demonstrated the negative effect of a too lethal approach in dealing with insurgencies.¹³ The ability of the COIN forces to generate lessons from their mistakes and to quickly implement them along with COIN training has changed positively the course of the COIN campaign. Now in Afghanistan and Iraq, the strategy of “clear-hold-build” is adopted, and the outstanding initiative of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) is implemented.¹⁴

The case studies of the insurgencies in the Casamance region of Senegal, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire will demonstrate how the kinetic and overly lethal approach has worsened the situation in those countries. The study will identify non lethal means that could be used to help solve these conflicts, or at least reduce them to a lower level of violence so that long term political settlements might be possible. Finally, this thesis will propose the use of other non lethal means by using the other elements of national power, or DIME (diplomacy, informational, military and economy), in conjunction with, and only if necessary, lethal means, to decisively defeat an insurgency. To set the stage, a background of the three cases that will be used in this thesis will be given by the following lines.

Background of Senegal's Casamance Conflict

The Republic of Senegal is a former French colony in West Africa. The country obtained its independence in 1960. It covers 196,190 sq km and is bordered by: Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, and the Atlantic Ocean. The population is around 13,000,000.

The Casamance region is the southern part of the Republic of Senegal between the Gambia Republic, and the Republic of Guinea Bissau. Since the early eighties, this region had been destabilized by a rebel group, The Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC). The Senegalese government has been fighting this insurgency for more than twenty years and the region is still not completely secured. The foundation of the MFDC has its origins in the segregation policy during the colonization. In 1914, a native Senegalese, Blaise Diagne, was elected to the French Parliament as Senegal's

representative. In 1916, Blaise Diagne convinced the French Parliament to approve a law granting full citizenship to the residents of Dakar, Goree, Rufisque and Saint Louis. This led the rest of the Senegalese population to create regional organizations to stand for the interest of their region, like the *Bloc Democratique de Kédougou* (BDK) created by Mady Cissokho. Also, other “non political” movements were born in 1947: *l’Union Générale des Originaires de la Vallée du Fleuve* (UGOVAF) and the *Mouvement des forces Démocratiques de Casamance* (MFDC). The aim of the later organization was to organize the natives of the Casamance Region so that they could choose their appropriate delegates to stand up for their interests during the territorial assemblies.¹⁵ Of the five founding members of the MFDC as political party in 1947 only two were Diola, the dominant ethnic group of the Casamance region (approximately 60 percent).¹⁶ The Diola represent about 3.7 percent of the Senegalese population. When Senegal obtained its independence from France in 1960, the MFDC was absorbed by the *Bloc Democratique Senegalais* (BDS), the state-party of Senegal’s first president, President Leopold Sedar Senghor.



Figure 2. Map of Senegal

Source Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/SG.html> (accessed 8 June 2009).

The Grievances

In 1980, President Senghor resigned from office and was replaced by his Prime Minister, Abdou Diouf. In 1981, Abdou Diouf was democratically elected as President of the Republic of Senegal. The present MFDC was reborn in 1980, twenty years after Senegal's independence.¹⁷ The central grievance of the MFDC was that the Casamance Region was a separate entity from the rest of Senegal during colonization, and that President Senghor had promised independence to the region after twenty years. Other grievances were related to the neglect of the Casamance population by the central government along with the expropriation of land since independence, by both the State

and immigrants from northern Senegal, resulting in a significant migration of Muslim farmers and petty traders to the Casamance that had taken place by the 1980s.¹⁸

Chronology of the Conflict

This study will divide the Casamance conflict into two main phases: from 1982 to 1999, and from 2000 to 2008. The first phase took place under the President Abdou Diouf, and the second under the current President Abdoulaye Wade. This division does not follow the escalation of violence, but will help accentuate the different approaches of the *Parti Socialiste (PS)* which has ruled the Senegal Republic since its independence, and the *Parti Democratique Senegalais (PDS)* which became the first opposition party to win the presidential elections in 2000.

Phase I: from 1982 to 1999

A pro-independence demonstration was staged in the Casamance regional capital of Ziguinchor, in late December 1982, in which the Senegalese flag was torn down and MFDC literature distributed. The leader of the revived MFDC, Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, a Catholic priest, was arrested and later sentenced to five years imprisonment for subversion by the State Security Court.¹⁹ A more serious demonstration took place at Diarbir and Ziguinchor in December 1983, in which machetes, bows and arrows, and firearms were used. The Senegalese government used police and military forces to reprimand the demonstrators, and further detentions occurred. Progressively, the MFDC armed wing, *Attika* (warrior in Diola) was born. The insurgents lived among the population but started building bases in the forest. The MFDC started collecting taxes from the locals.

MFDC Secretary General Father Diamacoune Senghor was released in December 1987 at the end of his sentence, along with his deputy, and later MFDC Europe representative, Mamadou Sane Nkrumah. Significant events took place between 1988 and 1989. The first was the dispute of the opposition parties over the presidential elections verdict of February 1988 which led to the imposition of a state of emergency for 3 months. The second was the end of the Senegambia Confederation in September 1989, which was built in 1981, after the Senegalese Army saved the Gambian president from invaders. The third was the rejection by the Republic of Guinea Bissau of the judgment by the Geneva Court which had attributed oil resources found in the Atlantic Ocean, along the borders between the two countries, to the Republic of Senegal. Finally, the relationships between Senegal and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania were at their worst after a dispute in 1989. These events weakened the Senegalese government, making it easy for the MFDC to find external support for its cause. The movement started waging guerrilla warfare. The aggressive and violent “carrot-and-stick” approach of the government to get rid of the insurgency led Attika to find more support among the Casamance population. The conflict started escalating and reached a peak in 1990. Diamacoune was rearrested that year. In 1991 the first ceasefire agreement between the Government and the MFDC was signed. This was followed in May by the release of Father Diamacoune Senghor and 350 Casamance detainees.²⁰ On 31 May the commander of Attika, Sidi Badji, signed a ceasefire agreement with Defense Minister Medoune Fall in Cacheu, Guinea Bissau. It provided for the full withdrawal of military forces and an end to hostilities, as well as the free movement of people and goods.²¹ The renewed

violence in early 1992 revealed a failure of the political wing to control the armed branch of the insurgency. It resulted from a split of the MFDC: a northern Front (*Front Nord*), under the leadership of Sidi Badji and Kamougue Diatta, and a southern Front (*Front Sud*) with Father Diamacoune Senghor and Leopold Sagna.²²

The northern Front respected the cease-fire agreement, but the southern did not. Significant clashes between the army and the southern wing took place and Diamacoune fled to Guinea Bissau. In September 1992 Sidi Badji and Kamougue Diatta appealed over Radio Ziguinchor for respect of the ceasefire.²³

President Diouf announced that he was launching a fresh initiative to solve the Casamance problem. Its shape began to emerge on 19 March 1992 when, following Senegalese pressure, the Guinea Bissau authorities put Father Diamacoune Senghor on a flight to Ziguinchor. There he was placed under the protection of the Catholic Archbishop who was an opponent of Casamance secession. His arrival was preceded by a peace march in Ziguinchor of some 10,000 people, organized by various civic groups. On 8 April, the MFDC Secretary General broadcast a ceasefire appeal. Three months later he and other members of the MFDC's Central Bureau signed a ceasefire agreement in Ziguinchor underwritten by Guinea Bissau. This second ceasefire largely held until the start of 1995. This was also the year when the Senegalese gendarmerie and its Drug Squad carried out large-scale cannabis eradication campaigns in the Casamance. The MFDC was earning great revenues by exploiting the timber and levying taxes on the cannabis production.

At the beginning of October 1998 Father Diamacoune Senghor announced the establishment of a 34-member Provisional Steering Committee, in consultation with Sidi Badji, as part of a peace initiative to facilitate future negotiations between the MFDC and the Dakar Government.²⁴ President Diouf appealed for a peace settlement in Casamance in his New Year speech, with the sole precondition that negotiations must be within the framework of Senegal. He visited Casamance and made a further speech calling for peace addressed to Father Diamacoune Senghor, Sidi Badji, Léopold Sagna (alias Toussaint Bassène), Salif Sadio and all others.²⁵

Phase II: from 2000 to 2008

In March 2000, the opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade won the Presidential elections. This was the first time in the post independence period that an opposition party won the presidency. This political change was a new source of hope for resolving the Casamance conflict. President Wade stated that a decisive end of the Casamance conflict was among his first priorities. He would use a diplomatic approach, involving the neighboring countries Guinea Bissau and Gambia, and giving more responsibilities to the natives of Casamance.

A peace agreement was signed in March 2001. In December 2004, a cease fire agreement was signed by the Minister of interior Ousmane Ngom and Father Diamacoune Senghor. A relatively calm period followed this cease fire agreement. During the negotiations with the government, an internal conflict among the MFDC political leaders weakened the insurgents. Their ability to control Attika became very limited. MFDC Secretary General Father Diamacoune Senghor in an interview in 28 June

1999, stated: “there is a difference between our proposals and the situation on the ground. While some are working towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict, others are doing just the opposite. Unfortunately, those who jeopardize the peace process are more successful.”²⁶ A military wing of the southern front, lead by Salif Sadio moved north. The result was more violence in the north which used to be calmer. The insurgents fought each other for the control of the cannabis trafficking and the timber exploitation. Sidi Badji died in 2003. On 17 January 2007, Father Diamacoune Senghor died in Paris after being evacuated by the government.

Background of Côte d’Ivoire’s Civil War

The Republic of Côte d'Ivoire (or Ivory Coast) is a former French colony in West Africa. The country gained its independence in 1960. It covers 322,460 sq km and is bordered by: Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali and the Atlantic Ocean. The population is around 20 million inhabitants.²⁷ Côte d'Ivoire was considered one of the most stable and the most prosperous countries in West Africa until the death of its first President Houphouët-Boigny in 1993. Houphouët-Boigny had been in office since 1960 when the country gained its independence from France. A conflict for presidential succession upon Houphouët-Boigny’s death in 1993 put Henri Konan Bédié (the President of the parliament) and Alassane Dramane Ouattara (the prime minister) in opposition to one another. Henri Konan Bédié was declared President by the constitution but had to undergo elections within 2 years. In 1995, in an attempt to neutralize his major threat, Bédié brought back the concept of citizenship or “Ivorianness”.

The concept of “ivoirité” (Ivorianness) made its first appearance and rose to prominence after Houphouët-Boigny’s death. Its content is not actually new in

Cote d'Ivoire because of the events of 1970's when some Ivoirians felt that the country was invaded and, as a matter of consequence, that nationals from the bordering countries of Ghana, former Upper Volta now Burkina Faso, Guinea-Conakry, Mali, and countries like Togo and Benin, were taking away the financial resources from Ivoirians.²⁸

He established conditions that prevented Alassane Dramane Ouattara (who had a Burkinabe passport) from running for President. Bédié was re-elected in 1995 during elections boycotted by the opposition. This "Ivorianness" concept started generating xenophobia. In 1998, the government launched a national identification campaign. A new land regulation that restricted landownership to only Ivorian citizens came into effect.

The failure of the new land tenure policy has heightened conflicts between migrant farmers, Mossi, who formed the majority, and Ivorian planters. In the coastal region of Tabou, for example, disputes in 1999 over land turned into violent conflicts between indigenous and foreigners, leading to the eviction of Lobi farmers.²⁹

The population in the north of the country, which has been more ethnically and religiously aligned with the neighboring countries than the rest of Côte d'Ivoire was excluded and therefore became more and more frustrated.

In December 1999 General Robert Gueï took power after a military coup. He promised to bring back democracy in the country in a very short term. He organized Presidential elections in October 2000 in which Alassane Ouattara was prevented from participating by the 35th article of the law 2000-513 of 1st August 2000.³⁰ Contrary to Gueï's expectations, Laurent Gbagbo, who used to be the main opposition leader at the time of Houphouët Boigny, was declared winner of the Presidential elections by the electoral commission after some mass demonstrations.³¹



Figure 3. Map of Cote d'Ivoire

Source: CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/IV.html> (accessed 8 June 2009).

In September 2002, an unsuccessful coup, (the sixth coup or attempted coup in the space of less than three years) turned to an armed uprising, and created a decisive turn of events. The capital city of Abidjan was the site of gun and mortar attacks. During the fighting, General Gueï, who was suspected to be responsible for the soldier uprising, was killed by the government forces. The rebels retreated to the Muslim dominated north. They called themselves the Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI) and were led by Guillaume Soros. Their main grievances were related to land ownership laws, criteria of eligibility for elections, the issue of identity cards and domination of northerners by southerners.³² President Gbagbo, accusing his neighbors of helping the rebels, asked for

the help of the French government, but France refused, stating that it was an internal conflict. By late October two new rebel groups, each distinct from the MPCl, emerged.³³

French Involvement

France had been criticized by both sides. The Ivorian government stated that France, under the defense accords between the two countries, should help them sweep out the “aggressors” coming from neighboring countries. They also did not like the fact that Alassane Ouattara was protected by the French Embassy in Abidjan. On the other side, the rebels accused France of assisting the Ivorian government, and preventing them from continuing their march to the south. France had more than 1,000 troops serving as a buffer force between the rebel held north of Côte d’Ivoire and the government-controlled south.³⁴ On 11 December 2002, France announced it would step up its involvement in efforts to stop the escalating rebel conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. It started sending more troops to Côte d’Ivoire. A rebel spokesman accused the French of siding with the government in the conflict.

On 19 December rebels from the Ivorian Popular Movement for the Far West, or MPIGO, had overrun the strategic town of Man in the far West, recapturing it in less than two days. A meeting in Dakar, Senegal resulted in the decision by the ECOWAS to deploy a multinational force of about 1,500 troops to Côte d’Ivoire by the end of the year. The ECOWAS force was originally supposed to replace the French troops already deployed in Côte d’Ivoire. However conditions dictated that they work side by side. Simultaneously, France reinforced its military force in the country. The rebels remained

blocked however, by the heavily armed, battle-hardened French Legionnaires. On 21 December, the two forces met and clashes erupted just north of the town of Duekoue.³⁵

The three rebel factions in Côte d'Ivoire were preparing to meet on 23 December 2002 to discuss the increased involvement of French troops in blocking their attempt to overthrow the Ivorian government. The meeting took place in Bouake between the MPCl, the MPIGO, and the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP) which is also active in the West. The three Côte d'Ivoire rebel factions announced they would consider any future French attacks on their fighters to be an act of war. France had declared that it would not take sides in the conflict and that its presence was to protect French nationals and attempt to maintain the stability of the fragile cease-fire. Negotiations in Paris began on 15 January 2003. By the end of the negotiations, nine days later, the parties had signed the Lineas-Marcoussis accord which officially brought about the end of the armed conflict, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of fighters, the reestablishment of state authority throughout the country, the end of impunity and the policy of "Ivorianness" and the organization of presidential elections. The accord called for a power-sharing government of national reconciliation which would grant positions to rebel leaders as well as opposition parties. President Gbagbo was to remain President, although most executive power was to be transferred to a Prime Minister to be determined by consensus. Seydou Diarra, a Muslim from the rebel-held north, and former Prime Minister just prior to Mr. Gbagbo's election in 2000, was selected for the position. The new government was to orchestrate new and fair elections at a later date. The rebels also agreed to disarm to end the conflict. As soon as the accord was signed protests erupted in the main city of

Abidjan denouncing the deal for being too conciliatory to rebel demands. The pro-government military remained extremely contentious to the prospect of giving rebels the positions as the ministers of defense and interior, which had been promised in the accord.³⁶ In order to save the agreement and quell the unrest, a deal was brokered between the government and the rebels, who forfeited their claims to the two disputed ministries in exchange for two other government positions.³⁷ The rebels were given 9 of the 41 available cabinet positions. They did not show up for their ministerial duties, until 3 April 2003, when they began the slow process of integration into the government.

The United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI)

On 16 May 2003, the UN Security Council authorized a mission to send 75 observers of a peace keeping force to Côte d'Ivoire as MINUCI, or the UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire.³⁸ In late September 2003 the political dispute in Côte d'Ivoire appeared to be deepening, as some rebels began calling for independence for the part of the country they occupied.³⁹ On 27 February 2004 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1528 which established the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). UNOCI was designed to last an initial period of 12 months, starting from 4 April 2004, with a military strength of a maximum of 6,240 UN personnel.⁴⁰ The New Forces, led by Guillaume Soros, said that they would only disarm in phases in conjunction with the specific implementation of important clauses from the French negotiated agreement. Armed conflict broke out again on 8 June 2004 pushing the country even closer to the resumption of full-fledged civil war.⁴¹

On 31 July the Accra Agreement was signed with the goal of getting the peace process back on track. The implementation of the agreement was to be closely monitored by the UN and ECOWAS.⁴² Afterwards a Presidential decree by Gbagbo permitted Ouatarara to run in the election that was set for 30 October 2005.⁴³ A 20 September 2006 “mini-summit” between the UN, ECOWAS, the African Union (AU), the government, and rebels failed when President Gbagbo threatened to boycott. Gbagbo proposed his own peace plan and said that peacekeepers should leave the country. This issue, along with voter registration and disarmament difficulties, compelled the UN Security Council to postpone elections until at least October 2007.⁴⁴

Background of the Liberian Civil War

The Republic of Liberia was settled in 1822 by freed slaves from the United States, in West Africa. They quickly came to dominate the indigenous peoples in Liberia. The country became independent in 1847 and was ruled by these Americo-Liberians as they became to be known. The country covers 111,370 sq km and is bordered by: Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone and the Atlantic Ocean. The population is 3,334,587 (July 2008 est.), and the principal ethnic groups are: indigenous African 95 percent (including Kpelle, Bassa, Gio, Kru, Grebo, Mano, Krahn, Gola, Gbandi, Loma, Kissi, Vai, Dei, Bella, Mandingo, and Mende), Americo-Liberians 2.5 percent (descendants of immigrants from the U.S. who had been slaves), and Congo People 2.5 percent (descendants of immigrants from the Caribbean who had been slaves). The main religions practiced are: Christian at 40 percent, Muslim at 20 percent, and indigenous beliefs at 40 percent.⁴⁵



Figure 4. Map of Liberia

Source: CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/LI.html> (accessed 8 June 2009).

From independence in 1847 until 1980, the Republic of Liberia was a one-party state ruled by the Americo-Liberian dominated True Whig Party (TWP). In 1979 the country was paralyzed by violent riots caused by the increase in the price of rice. More than 40 people were killed in the violence. President William R. Tolbert appealed to Guinean leader Sekou Toure to quell the riots. Seven hundred Guinean soldiers were sent to Monrovia for three weeks. In 1980 Tolbert's opponents openly called for his overthrow. Their leader, Gabriel B. Matthews, and a dozen others were arrested in March 1980.⁴⁶

On 12 April 1980, President Tolbert was killed in a coup lead by Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe. The People's Redemption Council (PRC), headed by Doe, subsequently suspended the constitution and banned opposition political parties. On 15 October 1985, Doe's National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) was declared winner after a much contested election. Doe misruled the country, favoring his Krahn ethnic group. The Krahn, representing only 5 percent of the population, held 31 percent of cabinet posts in 1985.⁴⁷

On 12 November 1985, former Army Commanding General Thomas Quiwonkpa, who fled the country in November 1983 along with Prince Johnson and Charles Taylor, invaded Liberia by way of neighboring Sierra Leone. He was killed and Doe's government launched a bloody purge against the Gio and Mano ethnic groups in Quiwonkpa's Nimba County. Taylor, who was related by marriage to Quiwonkpa, benefitted from the alienation of the Nimba population, who later joined his cause.⁴⁸ He created the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).

Liberia's First Civil War: 1989-1996

On 24 December 1989, Charles G. Taylor, invaded Liberia from neighboring Côte d'Ivoire. He was helped by the governments of Libya, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire.⁴⁹ As NPFL forces advanced towards Monrovia in 1990, they targeted people of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups, both of which the NPFL considered supporters of President Doe's government. By June, Taylor was controlling almost 95 percent of the country. Prince Johnson split from the NPFL and created the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) consisting primarily of members from the Gio tribe. That event

weakened Taylor's movement.⁵⁰ In addition, ECOWAS intervened by sending forces called the West African Peace Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) made up, predominantly from Nigeria and Ghana. ECOMOG entered Monrovia in August 1990, and prevented Taylor from capturing Monrovia. At the end of that month, an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) was formed in Gambia under the auspices of ECOWAS and Dr. Amos C. Sawyer was designated President by Liberia's erstwhile political parties and other civilian interest groups. Neither Taylor nor Doe recognized the authority of the interim government.⁵¹ Despite a cease-fire agreement signed in Bamako, Mali, in 1990, the civil war went on. Johnson's forces captured and killed Doe on 9 September 1990.

By 1992, several warring factions had emerged in the Liberian civil war. Despite a peace accord signed in Cotonou, the capital of Benin, in 1994 Liberia's seven warring factions (the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), the United Liberation Movement with two wings referred to as ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K, the Liberia Peace Council, NPFL-CRC, the Lofa Defense Force and remnants of the Armed Forces of Liberia loyal to former President Samuel K. Doe) continued to fight.⁵²

In September 1995, after failing to honor more than 13 signed peace accords, under the auspices of ECOWAS, a Liberian Council of State, comprising the seven warring factions, was formed under the Abuja Peace Accord.⁵³ On 17 August 1996, Nigeria and other West African states brokered a cease fire between the warring factions. Disarmament in January 1997 was followed by democratic elections in July, which were won by Charles Taylor with 75 percent of the vote. A relative calm followed until 1999.⁵⁴

Liberia - Second Civil War: 1999-2003

The Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), a northern-based insurgent movement, had been fighting President Taylor since 1999. It was followed by the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), based in southern Liberia, in April 2003. The LURD offensive in May 2002 threatened Taylor. He decided to launch a national peace and reconciliation conference in Monrovia on 24 August, without major success. The International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) comprised of members from the UN, ECOWAS, AU, the World Bank, the United States, Ghana, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Sweden, tried to obtain a cease-fire between the Government and the LURD. By late May 2003 the security situation in Liberia was at its worst since the first rebel insurgency in 1999. By mid-June 2003, LURD forces controlled two-thirds of Liberia.⁵⁵

On 4 June 2003, a UN-backed court in Sierra Leone charged Taylor with “bearing the greatest responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law” in Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996. On 30 June 2003, Kofi Annan, the United Nations' Secretary-General requested the United Nations to deploy a multi-national force to Liberia. In addition, President Bush asked Charles Taylor to step down from power. On 11 August 2003, President Charles Taylor arrived in Nigeria to live in exile after having handed over power to his Vice-President Moses Bah. The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) with almost 18,000 UN peacekeepers started deploying in December 2003. After two years of rule by a transitional government, democratic elections in late 2005 brought President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf to power.⁵⁶

Significance

The case studies examined in this thesis depict how unsecure and unstable West Africa is. They represent different levels of insurgency.

The Senegalese case is interesting in the fact that it is Type I (local) insurgency.⁵⁷ It is “self-contained in cause, scope, and usually (though not necessarily) effects.” The country has succeeded so far to keep it at a low level for more than twenty years. On the other hand, the Senegalese have failed to decisively eradicate the insurgency in Casamance.

The Liberian conflict is a Type II (local-international) insurgency: insurgents often seek and receive external support (money, arms, expertise, media attention, fighters, and propaganda). Charles Taylor had successfully gone from a proto-insurgency to a full-blown insurgency. The active implication of the sub-regional organization, via ECOWAS, did not prevent Liberia from falling into a second civil war. This shows how fragile stability can be in a state of post conflict.

Finally, the Côte d’Ivoire case is also a Type II insurgency. Considering the speed of the escalation, it seemed to skip several phases and went directly to a full-blown insurgency.

Primary Research Question

How can non-lethal aspects of counterinsurgency be used to defuse insurgencies in West Africa?

Secondary Research Question

1. What kinds of activities are most effective in garnering regional and sub-regional cooperation between bordering nations in pursuing counterinsurgencies?
2. How should the government use its national instruments of power (DIME), in the West African context, to gain the support of the population for the counterinsurgency efforts?
3. How can the security forces be used in non-lethal ways to better promote the overall goals of a counterinsurgency?

Assumptions

West Africa will continue to experience civil wars which are the result of the rooted insurgencies throughout the whole region. This insurgency phenomenon is not understood enough. The governments are presently focused on eliminating the armed factions instead of addressing the grievances of the populations involved.

Limitations

Most of the negotiations and the clauses signed by the parties in conflict were held secret. The published agreement documents do not always depict all the conditions and concessions accepted by the parties.

Delimitations

The aim of this study is not an arbitration of the conflicts. It will not determine which party is right or which one is wrong. The analysis of the root causes of the conflict will be conducted only for the purpose of understanding the problem. A clear diagnostic

is necessary to find suitable non lethal approaches to solve or to contribute to a decisive solution. Any sensitive or classified information of the conflicts will not be reported in this thesis.

Definitions

Center of gravity: The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.⁵⁸

Civil war: "A civil war is a violent conflict within a country fought by organized groups that aim to take power at the center or in a region or to change government policies."⁵⁹ Civil war will be considered as a manifestation of the insurgency. It is included and is just a peak phase in the insurgency.

Counterinsurgency: Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a Government to defeat insurgency.⁶⁰

Insurgency: An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.⁶¹ "Insurgencies seek to replace an existing order with one that conforms to their political, economic, ideological, or religious vision."⁶² A RAND counterinsurgency study classifies insurgencies into four types: Type I is local, Type II is local-international, Type III is a global-local insurgency and Type IV is global insurgency. Insurgency in this study will refer to Type I and Type II. Type III and Type IV do not apply to the West African insurgencies.

Insurgent or rebel: refers to the opposing side of the established government, regardless of its legitimacy.

Intergovernmental organization: An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes and is usually formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples Include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union.⁶³

Lethal: Capable of causing death.

Non-lethal: All the diplomatic, economic, political and social elements of national power that exclude armed violence.

¹Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel, *Neopatrimonialism Revisited –Beyond a Catch-All Concept*. German Institute of Global and Area Studies. GIGA-WP-16/2006. http://repec.giga-hamburg.de/pdf/giga_06_wp16_erdmann-engel.pdf (accessed 15 January 2009)

²<http://globaledge.msu.edu/countryInsights/countryrank.asp> (access 12 January 2009).

³Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 2006)

⁴Ibid.

⁵Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare* (Oxford, United Kingdom: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 112.

⁶Ibid., 168.

⁷Ibid., 169.

⁸Ibid., 170.

⁹Ibid., 208.

¹⁰Ibid., 212.

¹¹Ibid., 113.

¹²Ibid., 220.

- ¹³Ibid., 226, 232.
- ¹⁴Ibid., 232, 233, 258.
- ¹⁵Momar-Coumba Diop, *le Sénégal et ses voisins*. (Dakar Senegal: Sociétés - Espaces - Temps 1994), 193.
- ¹⁶Ibid.
- ¹⁷Paul Collier and Nicolas Sambanis, *Understanding Civil War: volume 1 Africa* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), 250.
- ¹⁸Diop, 196.
- ¹⁹African Research Group, *The Casamance Conflict 1982-1999*, RESEARCH & ANALYTICAL PAPERS, Foreign and Community Commonwealth Office, London August 1999.
- ²⁰Ibid., 6.
- ²¹Ibid.
- ²²Collier and Sambanis, 252.
- ²³African Research Group, *The Casamance Conflict 1982-1999* (London: Foreign and Community Commonwealth Office, August 1999).
- ²⁴Ibid.
- ²⁵Ibid.
- ²⁶Ibid.
- ²⁷CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html> (accessed 8 June 2009).
- ²⁸Siendou A. Konate, "The Politics of Identity and Violence in Côte d'Ivoire," *West Africa Review*, no. 5 (2004). <http://www.westafricareview.com/issue5/konate.htm#ref5> (accessed 8 June 2009).
- ²⁹Youssouf Diallo, Working Paper No. 74, *From Stability to Uncertainty: A Recent Political History Of Côte D'Ivoire*. Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Papers, 2005, 10.
- ³⁰According the article 35, to run for president, your father and mother must be original Ivorian, and you should not have had any other nationality.

³¹Diallo, 10.

³²Arnim Langer, Working Paper No. 13, *Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Conflict: The Case of Côte d'Ivoire*, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), November 2004, 32.

³³Globalsecurity.org. "Ivory Coast," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/ivory-coast> (accessed 28 December 2008).

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Onuci.org, <http://www.onuci.org/> (accessed 28 December 2008).

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Globalsecurity.org., "Ivory Coast."

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/li.html> (accessed 28 December 2008)

⁴⁶Adekeye Adebajo, *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 22.

⁴⁷D. Elwood Dunn and S. Byron Tarr, *Liberia: A National Polity in Transition* (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1988), 199-200.

⁴⁸Ademola Adeleke, "The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacekeeping in West Africa: The ECOWAS Operation in Liberia," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 33, no. 4 (1995): 575.

⁴⁹Adekeye Adebajo.54.

⁵⁰Ademola Adeleke, 575.

- ⁵¹Ibid., 579.
- ⁵²Adekeye Adebajo, 164.
- ⁵³Ibid., 183.
- ⁵⁴United Nations Mission in Liberia, <http://unmil.org> (accessed 28 December 2008).
- ⁵⁵Ibid.
- ⁵⁶Ibid.
- ⁵⁷David C. Gompert and John Gordon IV. *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency* (New York: RAND, 2008), 25.
- ⁵⁸Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 2001).
- ⁵⁹James Fearon, "Iraq's Civil War," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2007), <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070301faessay86201/james-d-fearon/iraq-s-civil-war.html> (accessed 8 June 2009)
- ⁶⁰JP 1-02.
- ⁶¹Ibid.
- ⁶²Gompert and Gordon, 23.
- ⁶³JP 1-02.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Lethal versus non lethal in COIN Theory

Sir Robert Thompson states that the population afraid of the insurgents' reprisals will cooperate less with government forces. The "search-and-clear" operations, along with the arbitrary arrest and torture of the population will create more insurgents than it kills. He distinguishes three types of recruits: the *naturals* ranging from the idealist to the criminal, who see no future prospects in the existing society; the *converted* are those who join the insurgency because of government excesses and abuses of power; and the *deceived* category includes those who earlier joined for legitimate reasons and youths abducted from their village.¹ Expanding government forces to fight the insurgents with some fixed ratio is nonsense for Thompson. The key is to insure that the insurgent rate of expansion is slower so that the favorable ratio is steadily improved.² For this purpose, he has established five "basic principles of counter-insurgency." First, the government must have a clear political end state. Second, the government must function in accordance with the law. Third, the government must have an overall plan which includes security, political, social, economic, administrative, police and other measures that have a bearing on the insurgency. Fourth, the government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerillas. Fifth, in the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first.³

Paraphrasing Sun Tzu, McCuen develops his theory from the perspective of an indigenous government dealing with an insurgency. He stresses the political,

psychological, and military fundamentals and develops a set of guiding principles. He argues that “the most logical solution does lie in developing a counter revolutionary strategy which applies revolutionary principles in reverse to defeat the enemy with his own weapon on his own battlefield.”⁴ McCuen bases his counter-revolutionary theory on Mao’s revolutionary theory. Therefore, he distinguishes four strategic basic phases of the insurgency: organization, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and mobile warfare.⁵ He also considers five principles of the revolutionary: preserving oneself and annihilating the enemy, establishing strategic bases, mobilizing the masses, seeking outside support, and unifying the effort.⁶ He thinks that they should be the same principles of COIN, and explains how to apply them “in reverse.” First, the immediate objective of the government must be “the preservation of its own bases, populations, and forces.”⁷ Second, the government must consolidate its controlled area into strategic bases from which it will expand to contested areas, and then “send its forces into revolutionary controlled areas where they must build the backward villages into advanced, consolidated base areas, into military political, economic and cultural counter-revolutionary bastion.”⁸ Third, the population support, being vital in winning the war, “it must be the foundation of military, political, or psychological action during any phase of the revolutionary warfare.”⁹ Mobilizing the masses requires sufficient force to destroy or neutralize the insurgents’ organization, simultaneously protecting the populations from rebels’ reprisal, and finally persuading the populations to set up counter-revolutionary organizations. The government must properly address the current grievances of the populations, and propose tangible alternatives that meet their aspirations.¹⁰ Fourth, the government should attempt

early to discredit the insurgency and isolate it from international support. The active support of bordering countries is key of this principle. The fifth principle, unifying the effort, requires the use of military, political, psychological, economic, and organizational action from the village to national levels. These actions must be carefully planned and coordinated, focusing on specific objectives.¹¹ Those five principles are interdependent and should be overridden by the “unity of principle.”¹²

In *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, David Galula starts by defining *revolutionary war* as either insurgency or counterinsurgency. For him it is a “fight between a lion and a fly.”¹³ Paraphrasing Clausewitz, he states that “insurgency is pursuit of the policy of a party, inside a country, by every means.”¹⁴ His understanding of insurgency covers the Type I (local) and Type II (local-international) of the RAND COIN studies *War by Other Means*, but not necessarily Type III (global-local insurgency) and Type IV (global insurgency). However his definition of insurgency as “a *protracted struggle* conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order”¹⁵ is similar to the definition of the current military manual FM 3-24. For Galula, revolutionary war is a political war, and the population is the center of gravity, because “the exercise of political power depends on its tacit or explicit agreement or, at worst, on its submissiveness.”¹⁶ He thinks that a cause defined by Mao as an “unsolved contradiction” and a police and administrative weakness are key to the existence and the success of the insurgency. In addition, a “not-too-hostile geographic environment and outside support (moral, political, technical, financial or military)” may become necessary.¹⁷ Because of the limits on

conventional warfare to conduct COIN, Galula proposes four laws. First, “the support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent.” Second, “support is gained through an active minority.” Third, “support from the population is conditional.” And finally, “intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential.”¹⁸ From those four laws are derived eight principles:

1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents.
2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent’s comeback in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives.
3. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas.
4. Destroy the local insurgent political organizations.
5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities.
6. Test these authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the softs and the incompetents; give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defense units.
7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement.
8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants.¹⁹

Galula warns that those principles must be applied in the proposed order.

A very significant and recent military manual of counterinsurgency is Field Manual (FM) 3-24 of the United States Army. FM 3-24 defines *Counterinsurgency* as “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.” FM 3-24 highlights the necessity of the integration of civilian and military activities. “Military efforts are necessary and important to counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts, but they are only effective when integrated into a comprehensive strategy employing all instruments of national power.”²⁰ The non-lethal component is critical to this approach in COIN operations. The logical lines of operations (LLO) are: combat operations/civil security operation, host nation security forces,

essential services, governance and economic development. From these five logical lines of operations, only the first one can be considered as lethal, and its end state is only to provide security and freedom of lawful movement to the population. As seen in the paradoxes of COIN in Chapter 1, “tactical success guarantees nothing.”

The RAND Counterinsurgency study “War by Other Means” classifies insurgencies into four types: Type I is local, Type II is local-international, Type III is global-local insurgency and Type IV is global insurgency. Insurgency in this study will refer to Type I and Type II. Type III and Type IV do not really apply to the West African insurgencies. “*War by Other Means*” mostly focuses on the Type III (global insurgency), and highlights the capabilities the United States should develop to fight it. Even though the insurgencies in West Africa are dominated by Type I and II, this study provides appreciable resources to develop a non lethal approach against insurgency.

Fighting the insurgency requires winning the contest for the population’s support. According to RAND, “the more energetic the effort to enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of local government, the less likely it is that insurgency will reach the point at which deadly force is needed.”²¹ The use of lethal and destructive capabilities may be deleterious in the contest of the hearts and minds of the local population.²² Therefore, the need for civil capabilities becomes obvious.

Providing security to the population is key in COIN. Knowing the “paradox of force,” “War by Other Means” explores three alternatives to lethal capabilities to provide security: an early and sustained use of civil instruments of COIN, a competent and legitimate indigenous security service, and finally greater and smarter use of information

power.²³ Three civil COIN strategies have been tried: the carrot-and-stick, hearts-and-minds, and transformation. The *carrot-and-stick* strategy dispenses public service conditionally, rewarding pro-government behavior and punishing pro-insurgency behavior. It is the one most likely used in West Africa. *Hearts-and-minds* approach consists of sharing public services generously. It helps the government gain popular support, but is not enough to eradicate the insurgency. Finally the *transformation* strategy aims at the root causes of the insurgency, and primarily addresses the problem of governance. RAND considers this approach the best civil COIN strategy, because “insurgencies rarely succeed against capable, responsive and inclusive governments.”²⁴ Transformation however is a very long process, and can take years or decades.

The literature of COIN theory, gives an approach to deal with the problem of this thesis. COIN theorists all agree that there are non lethal lines of operation in COIN operations, and that they are critical to the outcome of the campaign. One major point that emerges from the COIN theories is that addressing the root causes of the insurgency is vital for success. The following literature will try to identify the root causes of insurgency in West Africa.

The Root Causes of Insurgency in West Africa

The right approach in defusing an insurgency will depend a lot on the root causes. An accurate diagnostic of the root causes is necessary to conduct COIN. The World Bank mostly uses the CIA’s definition of insurgency; *Insurgency* is “a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations.”²⁵

This definition highlights “controlling the resources” as the ultimate goal of the insurgents. Because of disastrous economic consequences, the economic world does seem to make any distinction between insurgency and civil war. They define civil war as “an internal conflict with at least 1,000 combat-related deaths, with both an identifiable rebel organization and government forces suffering at least five percent of these casualties.”²⁶ Their main argument is that civil wars are caused by greed, not grievance. “The insurgents are indistinguishable from bandits or pirates.”²⁷ In many countries it is possible to find groups with a sufficiently strong sense of grievance to wish to launch a rebellion, but rebellions will occur only where they are materially feasible. This approach has been referred to as the *Collier-Hoeffler model*, named for a key contributor to this literature, Paul Collier and his co-author, Anke Hoeffler. Their goal was to develop an econometric model which predicts the outbreak of civil conflicts. The *feasibility* hypothesis had been added in 2006.²⁸ Civil war must be militarily and financially feasible. The comparison between the Tamil Tigers, a relatively small rebel group in the small developing country of Sri Lanka, spending between \$200m and \$350m per year, and the world’s major political opposition parties, the British leading opposition political party spending around \$50m per year is a good proof for financial needs.²⁹ Their quantitative analysis is quite consistent in predicting the likelihood of civil war. However, it fails to propose a valuable means to defeat the insurgency. Furthermore, by denying any political goal to the insurgents, their point of view is contradictory to Clausewitz’s assertion that “war is the continuation of politics by other means.”

The inability to establish a classical Clausewitzian “Trinity” (that a nation requires the support of the government, the people and the military to go to war) network for an insurgency usually leads to the inappropriate and excessive use of lethal forces to eliminate the rebels. The fact that the insurgents are considered as “economic bandits” or “pirates” closes the door to any negotiation. A government unable to eradicate this type of threat would hardly convince its people or any foreign investors of its capability to guarantee security in its country. In addition, to consider the insurgents as criminals means that anybody who has a friendly interaction with them or does not denounce them becomes guilty or suspect. So there is no doubt that the populations that support the insurgents or that are even neutral would be criminal in the eyes of the government. Forcing the population to take sides while the government is unable to provide enough security for them, pushes them to have more sympathy for the insurgents, who often already have ethnic, cultural or kinship relations with the population.

Duyvesteyn’s book, “Clausewitz and African War” aims to reinterpret current conflict in Africa based on the theories put forth two hundred years ago by the Prussian theorist. She argues, in other words, that far from being random and apolitical, as they now tend to be portrayed, these conflicts have a political logic and are a continuation of the region's politics by other means. Although Duyvesteyn does not take on the Collier-Hoeffler model explicitly, she is in effect rejecting their econometric claim that the desire for personal gain lies at the heart of these conflicts. She uses case studies of Liberia and Somalia to show that broader strategic concerns motivated the leaders of both sides of

these civil wars. She does not, however, deny that the warlords of Liberia and Somalia sought power in order to control significant revenue streams.

Duyvesteyn tries to prove that the actors involved in these conflicts are political actors, they fight for political interests, and they use military force as a political instrument. For this purpose, she borrows the definition of politics from the book by Robert Dahl, entitled *Modern Political Analysis*. A *political system* is “any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves, to a significant extent, power, rule, or authority.”³⁰ She defines *power* as “the ability to influence the rational choice of others”, *authority* as “the possession of legitimate power”, and *rule* as “the persistent control of this authority.”³¹ *Legitimacy*, being “what turns power to authority”, exists as long as there is a belief in the legitimacy of the exercise of power.³² Duyvesteyn argues that most of African countries’ political systems are characterized by a personalized rule based on a patron-client system called *patrimonialism*. “The patron provides his client with favors in return for loyalty, and the client in turn becomes the patron to others, thereby establishing a hierarchical order of society.”³³ There are few routes to power and influence other than through the ruler. Since the insurgents are excluded from this patron-client network, their only means to initiate political change is the use of arms.³⁴ Since it is difficult for the ruler to reach everybody, it becomes easy for the insurgents to find support for their causes. This trinitarian approach will provide a valuable framework to shape the strategic, operational and tactical center of gravities of the insurgency.

Paul Tiyambe Zeleza thinks that many postcolonial conflicts are far from being pathologic as they are usually depicted and are rooted in colonial conflicts.³⁵ He

identifies five types of wars, the distinction between which are based primarily on their political thrust and ideological tendencies: imperial war, anti-colonial wars, intra-state wars, inter-state wars, and international wars.³⁶ Africa's postcolonial wars are dominated by the intra-state wars and the inter-state wars. The intra-state wars are those studied in this thesis. He distinguishes, in terms of their objectives, six types: secessionist wars, irredentist wars, wars of devolution, wars of regime change, wars of social banditry, and armed inter-communal insurrections.³⁷ *Secessionist wars* concerns the wars waged by groups or regions that seek to become independent nations. In West Africa, the Igbo-dominated provinces in south-eastern Nigeria tried to break away from Nigeria which resulted in the tragic civil war of Biafra. *Irredentist wars* are those conducted by a group that seeks to unite or reunite with a country to which it is ethnically or historically related. During the insurgency of the Casamance region of Senegal, speculations were made about the "axis of the three B", Banjul-Bignona-Bissau, standing for the unification of Bissau, the capital city of the Republic of Guinea Bissau, Bignona, a city in Casamance and Banjul the capital city of the Gambia Republic. When Kukoï Samba Sagnang staged a coup in Gambia in 1981, he promised to complete the "3B axis project." He was quickly removed by the Senegalese Army which brought back Gambia's President Diawara who had fled to Dakar.³⁸ *Wars of devolution* are generated by attempts by marginalized ethnic, religious and regional groups to regenerate the terms of incorporation into the state and the national political space. Their objective is decentralization rather than secession.³⁹ *Wars of regime change* are "engineered by self-described revolutionary movements that seek to overthrow the existing government and

establish a new socio-economic dispensation, including conditions and content of citizenship.”⁴⁰ Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire are good examples of such. *Wars of social banditry* are “widespread acts of violence that are socially organized against the state and other social institutions, with the objective not of capturing state power as such but of creating chaotic conditions that are conducive to predatory accumulation.”⁴¹ In this definition, Zeleza is targeting the warlords and the terrorists. *Armed inter-communal insurrections* “are often episodic eruptions of violence, sparked by specific incidents that stoke long simmering antagonisms, anxieties and aggressions.”⁴² Finally, Zeleza outlines the collateral damages of the “War on Terror” led by the United States in Africa.

Many African governments have rushed to pass broadly, badly or cynically worded anti-terrorism laws and other draconian procedural measures, and to set up special courts or allow special rules of evidence that violate fair trial rights, which they use to limit civil rights and freedoms, and to harass, intimidate, and imprison and crackdown on political opponents.⁴³

He gives the example of Morocco, which has used anti-terrorism laws to detain 5,000 people since May 2003.

Ali A. Mazrui sees the roots of conflict in many domains. First the states that the Africans inherited from the colonial powers were built on fragile bases. The later destroyed old methods of conflict resolution and traditional African political institutions, and failed to replace them effectively.⁴⁴ Second, the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885 established artificial boundaries in Africa, separating people from a same entity and putting together people who had almost nothing in common. He explores, after the enabling roles played by religion and ethnicity, resources and identity, and the military. He believes that to overcome those differences, Africans must cultivate tolerance,

develop pluralism, improve civil-military relations and foster innovative Pan-African solutions.⁴⁵

Errol A. Henderson argues that “African civil wars largely result from internal factors within African states; specifically, from the failure of African states to respond adequately to the simultaneous challenges of state-building and nation-building.”⁴⁶ Using logistic regression analyses, he concludes that first, the previous colonial experience can help predict the likelihood of civil war, second, economic development reduces the likelihood of civil war while militarization increases it, and finally, neither regime type nor cultural factors plays a significant role in African civil war.⁴⁷

John Akokpari uses the case study of Cote d’Ivoire to prove that most African civil wars resulted from the artificial colonial borders, the inability of the state to deal with the complexity of African politics, and external factors. He points out the major role played by the struggle over the state and the resources, which was exacerbated by a struggle over citizenship in Cote d’Ivoire and initiated the civil war.

Thandika Mkandawire criticizes the World Bank literature of confusing the ways insurgencies are financed and ignoring the true “root causes.” He believes that most African civil wars are initiated in the capital cities and reflect a serious urban malaise. The insurgents often leave to find sanctuaries in rural areas, where they not only capture potential resources but also cause lot of suffering to local populations, for the prosecution of war. This, in conjunction with their unclear political agenda, and the apathy or hostility of local communities leads to the tendency to view the insurgents as criminals and

bandits. He warns that “the view that these conflicts are merely driven by greed is not merely cynical, but can only lead to fatal political blindness.”⁴⁸

This chapter has presented some COIN theories from which this thesis will select the non lethal lines of operation to deal with insurgencies in West Africa. It has also tried to identify the root causes that must be addressed to successfully conduct COIN operation in West Africa. Chapter three will define the methodology that will be used to conduct the analysis in this thesis.

¹Sir Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam* (St Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 1966), 34.35.

²*Ibid.*, 48.49.

³*Ibid.*, 57.

⁴John J. McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War* (St Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 1966), 78.

⁵*Ibid.*, 40.

⁶*Ibid.*, 73.

⁷*Ibid.*, 51.

⁸*Ibid.*, 53.

⁹*Ibid.*, 64.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 5.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 72.

¹²*Ibid.*, 73.

¹³David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (St Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 1964), xi.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 3.

- ¹⁵Ibid., 4.
- ¹⁶Ibid., 8.
- ¹⁷Ibid., 42.
- ¹⁸Ibid., 71.
- ¹⁹Ibid., 80.
- ²⁰Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 2-1.
- ²¹Gompert and Gordon, xxxii.
- ²²Ibid., 42.
- ²³Ibid., 69.
- ²⁴Ibid., xxxix.
- ²⁵Central Intelligence Agency, *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office).
- ²⁶Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, CSAE Working Paper 2002-01 World Bank, March 13, 2002.
- ²⁷Herschel I. Grossman, "Kleptocracy and Revolution," *Oxford Economic Paper* 51 (1999): 269.
- ²⁸Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, *Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War*, CSAE Working Paper /2006-10, 7 August 2006.
- ²⁹Ibid.
- ³⁰Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 6.
- ³¹Ibid., 9, 53.
- ³²Ibid., 10.
- ³³Ibid., 8.
- ³⁴Ibid., 10.

³⁵Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyaambe Zeleza, *The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes & Costs* (Ohio University Press, 2007), 1.

³⁶*Ibid.*, 3.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 6.

³⁸Diop, 199.

³⁹Cassandra R. Veney, *Forced Migration in Eastern Africa* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

⁴⁰Nhema and Zeleza.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 7.

⁴²*Ibid.*, 8.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 13.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 37.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 41.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 54.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 66.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 127.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this study is not to develop a specific COIN theory for West Africa. This thesis will try to use the lines of operation of existing COIN theory and apply it to each of the case studies in West Africa. A distinction between the lethal lines of operation and the non lethal ones will be considered. The analysis in Chapter Four will show how well West African countries are currently executing COIN lines of operation. A comparison will be made between the lethal and the non lethal means, and the outcome of that analysis will determine the conclusion and shape the recommendations in Chapter Five. This chapter will explain the methodology used to conduct the research.

Research Design

The methodology that will be used in this thesis is a qualitative method using case studies. Qualitative research is fundamentally interpretive.¹ The study will use inductive reasoning. The findings resulting from the detailed analysis of the cases will be generalized to West Africa. Since the analysis will be conducted through the lens of a COIN actor in West Africa, obviously there are inherent biases and limitations. Those biases and limitations inherent to a qualitative inquiry do not necessarily affect the validity of the research. In an effort to further limit analytical bias, the author will analyze the result of a survey on the three case studies that were completed by four military officers from four different West African countries.

The case study approach is defined as “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to

other events.”² While a case study deals with the internal examination of a single case, a comparative method uses comparison among small number of cases. The methodology considered here is equivalent to a broader definition of a case study method which includes both within-case analysis of single cases and comparisons of small number of cases.³ In addition, the case study method is often considered as a subset of qualitative methods. “The case study produces the type of context-dependent knowledge that research on learning shows to be necessary to allow people to develop from rule-based beginners to virtuoso experts.”⁴ In addition, social scientists argue that “in the study of human affairs, there appears to exist only context-dependent knowledge, which, thus, presently rules out the possibility of epistemic theoretical construction.”⁵

The data to be analyzed will take the form of an abbreviated Delphi method consisting of a survey (appendix A) submitted to three West African experts (military officers from three West African nations) and the author’s response to the survey.

The Delphi method is based on a structured process for collecting and distilling knowledge from a group of experts by means of a series of questionnaires interspersed with controlled opinion feedback... The lacking of full scientific knowledge, decision-makers have to rely on their own intuition or on expert opinion. The Delphi method has been widely used to generate forecasts in technology, education, and other fields.⁶

After the comparison of the cases and the resulting analysis, the study will result in overall findings. Those finding will determine the conclusions and the recommendations to more effectively conduct COIN operations in West Africa

Case Selection

The cases studied are the Casamance insurgency in Senegal, the Liberian civil war, and the Cote d’Ivoire civil war. In order to avoid selection bias, the case studies

have to meet some requirements. The first requirement is that the cases must be representative of the phenomenon at hand. The second one is that they must be comparable. The third requirement is that the cases must differ in critical variables so as to highlight the factors that are more general and those that are specific to each particular case. And the fourth one is that the cases must be able to bring to the fore the particularities of the actors, their interests and instruments.⁷ To meet those four requirements, some delimitations for the case studies need to be identified, and some assumptions made.

Delimitations of the case studies.

The first delimitation is that other insurgencies have occurred in West Africa, such as in Sierra Leone, Niger, and Mali. Some of them are still ongoing. Moreover, with the operational environment described in Chapter One, insurgencies are likely to continue to occur in West Africa. They will not be studied in this thesis, but the three cases studied here are representative of the phenomenon of insurgency in West Africa. This fulfills the first requirement.

The second delimitation is that UN peace keeping operations will not be considered in this study as part of a COIN operation. The first reason is that even if UN forces deploy under Chapter VII of the UN charter, the lethal operations are not guided by COIN tactics. Second, UN intervention occurs mostly when the failure of the host nation to defeat the insurgency is obvious. Therefore we will consider the COIN phase ended by the intervention of any type of peace keeping force, even though there are a lot of similarities between the non lethal LLO of COIN and peace keeping operations. The

study assumes that the intervention of ECOMOG in Liberia ended the COIN operation conducted by Samuel Doe's government. The second part of Liberia conflict will not be part of the analysis because Charles Taylor did not have the opportunity to stabilize enough of the country at the point that one could expect the government to conduct a COIN operation correctly. The first Liberian civil war is known to have started with the rebel invasion on 24 December 1989,⁸ but this study will consider the beginning of the insurgency during or prior to the period that followed the fraudulent elections in 1985. The rationale is that because of the contested election, the grievances against Samuel Doe increased and General Quiwonkpa, his Chief of Staff, attempted a coup that failed.⁹ This led Doe to take actions against the population.

The same delimitation will be made regarding the Cote d'Ivoire conflict. The intervention of the Licorne force, which was a mixed-up of French and African forces, will be considered as the end of the COIN operations conducted by the government of Cote d'Ivoire. This force was replaced by the AU forces, and now there is a UN peace keeping force deployed in Cote d'Ivoire. Finally, in the Casamance case, there has been so far no intervention of an international force to assist the Senegalese government to deal with the insurgents. So while we will assume that the COIN campaign resulted in a failure of the government in Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia, the COIN operations will be considered ongoing in Senegal.

That second delimitation provides comparable cases to this study, which was the second requirement. In addition, the Casamance case is a secessionist insurgency while the Liberia and the Cote d'Ivoire cases are primarily ones for regime change. This

highlights the differences between the cases and the particularities of each of them.

Therefore the cases meet the third requirement. In addition, the background of the cases has shown that the actors involved, differ from their interest and their strategy also. This fulfills the fourth requirement. After choosing the cases, the variables for this study that will be analyzed will be specified.

Developing a Research Strategy: Specification of Variables

This study will use qualitative variables. A qualitative variable is a variable whose value varies by attributes or characteristics.¹⁰ Its choice is guided by the necessity of the variable to provide some leverage for policymakers to enable them to influence the outcome.¹¹ The variables will derive from the lines of operations of U.S. COIN Field Manual FM 3-24 and the U.S. Strategy COIN Guide 2009. The rationale is that those two documents contain most of the important points of COIN theorists. As an example, FM 3-24 outlines six logical lines of operations which are illustrated in fig 5.1.¹² On the other hand, the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, Jan 2009, outlines four vital LLOs as the components of COIN strategy: a political function, an economic function, a security function and an information function.¹³




Figure 5. Example of Logical Lines of Operations for a Counterinsurgency
Source: Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006) 5-3.

From the LLOs above, the study will add a diplomatic LLO. The diplomatic LLO will help understand the role played by neighboring countries or any major player.

Considering the LLO which concerns the development of host nation forces, the study will analyze the efforts accomplish by each country to develop and adapt its own forces to meet the COIN's campaign requirements.

In summary, five variables will be considered: diplomacy, economy, politics/governance, information, combat operations/civil security operations. The first

four variables are dealing with non lethal activities and last one will focus on methods armed forces use to secure the population. Using that framework, the LLOs that will be analyzed are as shown in the following table 1.




Figure 6. LLO of the Thesis

Definition of the Variables

Diplomacy

Diplomacy can be defined as “the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations.”¹⁴ This variable will help gain an appreciation of the impact of diplomatic relations between each country and its neighbors on the COIN campaign. Diplomacy can be used as a mechanism of conflict resolution through mediation. Diplomatic initiatives can be considered as “attempts by outside parties to transform a conflict by means of communicating information about the conflict that can help generate movement toward potentially overlapping bargaining positions.”¹⁵ The analysis will consider only the diplomatic relationships between the host nation and its immediate neighbors. Those relationships will have a critical effect on the ability of the insurgents to find external support and sanctuaries. It is obvious that external support does not necessarily come from the immediate neighboring countries. In the case of the Liberia conflict, for example, Libya and Burkina Faso were major players. The Libyan leader, Muammar Qaddafi, provided military support to Charles Taylor.¹⁶ Other big players are also the U.S. and France. Liberia lost its strategic importance to the U.S. at the end of the cold war era. Consequently, in 1989, the regime of Samuel Doe lost substantial U.S. military, economic and diplomatic support. Charles Taylor exploited the opportunity of this unstable phase to launch his insurgency.¹⁷ Similar analysis can be made of the relationship of France and Cote d’Ivoire. But as stated before, we will consider only the immediate neighboring countries which are critical for the insurgency’s sanctuaries.

Politics/Governance

“The political function is the key function, providing a framework of political reconciliation, and reform of governance around which all other COIN activities are organized. In general, a COIN strategy is only as good as the political plan at its heart.”¹⁸

Economic Development

The economic function seeks to provide essential services and stimulate long term economic growth, thereby generating confidence in the government while at the same time reducing the pool of frustrated, unemployed young men and women from which insurgents can readily recruit.¹⁹

The analysis of the economy takes in consideration only the effort of the government to set the conditions for the improvement of the economic situation of the local population. In other words, we will consider the performances of the government in the LLO of economy. In COIN theory, improving the economic condition of the population is key in the contest of their hearts and minds.

The purpose is not to conduct a deep econometric analysis. Since the aim of the economic LLO is to assess a positive improvement from the perspective of the local populace, just some basic needs will be considered: job creation, communications network improvement in order to increase access to the contested area, and the development of local economic activities. Each government will be judged by its success in providing a conducive environment for the populations to have those basic needs.

Information Operations

The fourth variable is information. Information is very critical in COIN. The information LLO comprises intelligence (required to gain understanding), and influence (to promote the affected government's cause).²⁰

Combat Operations/Civil Security Operations

This LLO is considered the most lethal one among the five LLOs. The U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide considers that:

the security function is an enabler for the other functions and involves development not just of the affected nation's military force, but its whole security sector, including the related legal framework, civilian oversight mechanisms and judicial system. Establishing security is not a precursor to economic and governance activity: rather security, economic and governance activity must be developed in parallel.²¹

FM 3-24 suggests that "the primary frontline COIN force is often the police-not the military".²² In Malaya, the police, not the army, served as the lead COIN force. The British expanded the Malayan police forces. In addition, they retrained the entire Malayan police forces. The choice of a government to adopt a military-oriented COIN strategy, instead of putting the police in the lead, can help determine relatively how lethal or non lethal the COIN campaign will be. Military forces are primarily lethal in nature whereas police forces are often more non lethal in the way they participate in COIN campaign.

Developing a Matrix

The five LLOs evolve during the COIN campaign; therefore the study will consider three different points of time: the beginning of the insurgency, during the COIN

campaign and the end of COIN operations. The *beginning* will provide the basis from which the government started its campaign. *During* will give an insight of how the five LLOs evolved during the Campaign. Obviously they do not have fixed values, but an approximate average will be considered. The *end* stands for the present time for the Casamance case since it is ongoing, but for Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia, it represents the beginning respectively of the Licorne Operation and the ECOMOG operation; the reason being the case studies' delimitations.

In addition, a scale of values ranging from (-5) to (+5) will be used. The sign (-) will be assigned if the LLO is negatively affected, and the sign (+) if it is positively affected. The value (0) is considered to be neutral. The range of five (5) will enable a differentiation to be identified between the comparative values for the three cases.

The values in all of the matrixes in Chapter Four are the average of the values assigned by the author in addition to the values ascribed to by the three other military officers from West Africa, who are knowledgeable in the subject, and who were the survey respondents. Their individual scores are available at Appendix B. Each of them was asked to score each of the five LLOs, for Senegal, Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire, at the beginning, during and at the end of the COIN campaign. Each of the officers will be provided with a copy of the methodology (Chapter Three) of this thesis and the following table to fill.

Table 1. Diplomatic Relationships between Senegal and its Neighbors
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Guinea Bissau			
Gambia			
Mauritania			
Mali			
Republic of Guinea			
Average			

Table 2. Diplomatic Relationships between Liberia and its Neighbors
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Cote d'Ivoire			
Republic of Guinea			
Sierra Leone			
Average			

Table 3. Diplomatic Relationships between Cote d'Ivoire and its Neighbors
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Liberia			
Republic of Guinea			
Ghana			
Mali			
Burkina Faso			
Average			

Table 4. Recapitulative Table for the 3 Countries for the Diplomatic LLO
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	end
Senegal			
Liberia			
Cote d'Ivoire			

Table 5. Politics/Governance LLO (value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	end
Senegal			
Liberia			
Cote d'Ivoire			

Table 6. Recapitulative of the Economic Development LLO
(value range: -5 to +5).

	beginning	during	end
Senegal			
Liberia			
Cote d'Ivoire			

Table 7. Use of Information in COIN Campaigns (value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	end
Senegal			
Liberia			
Cote d'Ivoire			

Table 8. Combat and Civil Security Operations
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Senegal			
Liberia			
Cote d'Ivoire			

The final score of each of the case studies for each of the LLOs will be the average value of the four scores of the four West African officers.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The analysis of the case studies will provide an insight of the approaches adopted by Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia to defeat their respective insurgencies. Their potential success or failure will help develop a better COIN strategy in West Africa. The need for a new strategy is justified by the fact that the region is still unstable. Moreover, the COIN record is not successful at all in the sub-region. Some countries like Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have failed, and other such as Senegal, Mali and Niger are still struggling to decisively defeat their insurgencies.

The purpose of this analysis is to determine how well the three studied countries have done in developing non lethal activities during their COIN campaign. This will be conducted by first evaluating their respective performances in four non lethal LLO: Diplomacy, Politics, Economic Development, and Information operations. Second the study will examine the LLO of Combat Operations and Civil Security Operations to investigate whether or not the COIN approach adopted by each government was over militarized and violence-oriented. It will be the opportunity to analyze how (if at all) the lethal strategy has jeopardized the success of government forces. Finally, the findings resulting from that analysis will determine the suggestions that will be made in the final chapter.

Analysis of the three case studies by logical lines of operation

The analysis of the case studies will consider the five LLOs: Diplomacy, Politics/Governance, Economic, Information Operations, and Combat/Civil Security Operations. Each of those LLOs will be analyzed in Senegal, Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire.

Diplomacy

Senegal

The Republic of Guinea Bissau and the Republic of Gambia are the two major players in the Casamance conflict. The project about the “axis of the three Bs” (Banjul-Bignona-Bissau, standing for the unification of Bissau, the capital city of the Republic of Guinea Bissau, Bignona, a city in Casamance, and Banjul, the capital city of The Gambia Republic) did scare the Senegalese officials. Fortunately the Senegalese Army saved the Gambian president's regime when Kukoï Samba Sagnang performed a coup in 1981. Kukoï Samba Sagnang threatened to achieve the “3B axis project.”²³

Gambia and Senegal kept a good relationship until 1989 when the Senegambian Federation collapsed. The diplomatic relationship has worsened since then. It is now at its worst because of increased Gambian involvement in the conflict. The Gambian president, Yaya Diahme, is a Diola, the same ethnic group of the Casamance insurgents. He is even suspected to be native of a village in the northern Casamance. The insurgents are now more active along the border with Gambia. The population has been given Gambian identification cards. They even vote during Gambian elections. In addition many MFDC leaders are suspected to live in Gambia. In a March 1994, an intercepted ship carrying arms and heading for Casamance was said to have been loaded by the Gambians. This

accusation by a private Senegalese newspaper, *Le Témoin*, was of course denied by the Gambian government.²⁴ In total, the relationship between Senegal and Gambia was excellent at the beginning of the conflict; they formed a confederation. It worsened gradually with time.

Guinea Bissau did not have good relationship with Senegal at the beginning of the conflict. In 1982, a border conflict arose because of some discovered offshore oil near the border. Preparing for a looming armed conflict, Guinea Bissau provided safe haven to the Casamance insurgents to weaken the Senegalese government.²⁵ The relationship worsened in 1989 when Guinea Bissau rejected the Geneva Court verdict which gave the offshore oil to Senegal. In May 1990, the Senegalese Armed forces went 40km inside the Bissau territory during what was called “the oil war.”²⁶ The relationship has since improved and Guinea-Bissau joined the West-African Monetary Union (CFA-countries) in May 1997. The relationship improved after 1998 when the Senegalese Armed Forces defeated a rebel side of the Bissau military forces lead by a former Bissau Army Chief of Staff who ousted the legitimate president, Nino Vieira. Since then, the diplomatic relations between the two countries has been very good. Guinea Bissau has lately conducted major combat operations to chase the MFDC insurgents from bases they had established in its territory. This obliged the insurgents to move to the northern border with Gambia.

Mauritania, on the other hand, had been suspected of providing weapons to the insurgents. The worst peak of the diplomatic relationship was in 1989. A border dispute led the two countries nearly to an armed conflict, and 80,000 black Mauritanian refugees

fled to Senegal.²⁷ The two countries have solved their differences, and the diplomatic relationships are much better.

Mali and the Republic of Guinea did not really influence the conflict. The relationship with those two countries was quite normal during the entire conflict, even if they have always seen Senegal as a potential rival in the sub-region. They did not affect the conflict either positively or negatively. From that analysis, the values in Table 1 are assigned to qualify the diplomatic relationships between Senegal and its bordering countries at the beginning, during and at the end of the COIN campaign.

Liberia

Liberia's overall diplomacy was badly affected after the coup led by Samuel Doe. Many African states did not recognize Doe's regime and tried to isolate it. The Liberian Foreign Minister was refused attendance to an Organization of African Unity (OAU) economic summit in Nigeria on 25 April 1980. Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria, which were rivals at that time, conspired to exclude Doe's delegation from the ECOWAS summit meeting in Togo later in the same year.²⁸

In addition to Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Sierra Leone did not get along with Doe's regime either. The Guinean president, Sekou Toure, who had sent 700 soldiers in 1979 to Monrovia to help former president Tolbert killed by Doe, was ironically the first one to recognize Doe's regime. He tried to reconcile Doe with other West African countries. Guinea needed to establish a good relationship with Liberia because it wanted access to Monrovia's port, and the new port of Buchanan, to export raw materials.²⁹

Liberia's relationship with Cote d'Ivoire was very bad. President Tolbert's son, Adolphus Tolbert, was the husband of Ivorian leader Houphouët-Boigny's adopted daughter. Houphouët-Boigny blamed Doe for the death of Adolphus Tolbert, and therefore helped Taylor conduct his insurgency. The relationship between Cote d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone remained the same during the conflict. Guinea became more reticent after the general condemnations of Doe's regime. From that analysis, the values in Table 1 are assigned to qualify the diplomatic relationships between Liberia and its bordering countries at the beginning, during and at the end of the COIN campaign.

Cote d'Ivoire

Cote d'Ivoire's diplomacy in West Africa weakened greatly during the period that followed the death of its first president, Houphouët Boigny, who had been in office for almost 33 years. From the early 1940s, the French colonial administration organized the transfer of forced labor from Upper Volta, today's Burkina Faso, to the cocoa and coffee plantations in Côte d'Ivoire. Houphouët-Boigny promoted the influx of foreign workers by introducing liberal landownership laws to increase the agricultural production of his country.³⁰ Houphouët-Boigny had encouraged the immigration of many farmers from Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea. The term Dioula is often used to describe Côte d'Ivoire nationals from the north of the country. This term is also sometimes used to describe nationals of neighboring countries, especially those from Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea."³¹ Those immigrants settled in the country and by 1998, they represented more than 25 percent of the population of Cote d'Ivoire. More than half of those immigrants originated from Burkina Faso,³² and after the coup in 2002, many fled back to Burkina

Faso. The xenophobic policy, supported by the “Ivorianness” concept, was aimed at those former immigrants. This destroyed relations between Cote d’Ivoire and its northern neighbors. From the beginning to the end of Cote d’Ivoire’s COIN campaign, the country had very bad diplomatic relations with Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea. Laurent Gbagbo accused them of invading his country and asked the French Army for help by virtue of the defense agreement between the two countries. The most involved, according to President Gbagbo, was Burkina Faso. Relations with Liberia were also very bad. President Gbagbo and the Liberian president Charles Taylor accused each other of supporting the insurgent groups hostile to their respective countries. Later, on 26 April 2003, ECOWAS convened a meeting between Gbagbo and Taylor in Togo at which on 3 May 2003 they agreed to secure the border region. With Ghana the relationships remained quite neutral.³³ Table 1 represents the values assigned to the diplomatic relations between Cote d’Ivoire and its neighbors at the beginning, during and at the end of the COIN campaign.

Table 9. Recapitulative Table for the 3 Countries for the Diplomatic LLO (value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	end
Senegal	0.8	-0.55	1.3
Liberia	-1.55	-1.7	-0.675
Cote d’Ivoire	-1.35	-1.6	-1.25

Findings

All three countries had very bad diplomatic relationship with their neighbors during the conflict. This highlights the easy ability of the insurgents to find external support. Therefore, West African countries tend to be actively involved in the insurgencies of their neighbors. Cote d'Ivoire, with the highest scores, had collapsed quicker. Only Senegal, which was able to reverse the tendency at the end of its campaign, has survived its insurgency.

Politics/Governance

Senegal

Senegal's political shift in 2000 led to better political opportunities in dealing with the Casamance insurgency. The new president, Abdoulaye Wade, gave the ministry of Armed Forces to a Casamance native. Since 2000, that ministry has been headed by a Casamance native. In addition, many important positions have been given to the Casamance elite. Consequently, the Senegalese Democratic Party, which has been ruling in Senegal since 2000, has won all the elections in the Casamance region.

The Casamance insurgency has provided more importance to the native elite. To win the hearts and minds of the population, the Senegalese government has given them a lot of privileges that they are not willing to easily give up. In addition, because of the potential security threat, Senegalese civil servants who are not Casamance natives resist being assigned in the region. Consequently, there are more job opportunities for the Casamance elite. The downside is that some of them do not necessarily have the skills or the qualifications required for their job. Unfortunately, they still represent the Senegalese

administration which might be judged incompetent by the locals. Their attitude tends to confirm the greed theory of civil war. Because they are afraid of losing their privileges at the end of the insurgency, they are playing in both sides, either in the insurgency or the counterinsurgency. The greed theory is confirmed by the internal fights among the insurgents and the assassination of some of their leaders. There has been a lot of problem in the replacement of Father Diamacoune Senghor. Since he passed away 13 January 2007 in Paris, there are many conflicting speeches about his potential successor.

The result is a fragmentation of the insurgency. From a COIN perspective, this split of the MFDC weakens the insurgency. Consequently it provides a better bargaining position for the Senegalese government. Nevertheless, the insurgent leaders whom the government is negotiating with no longer have an overarching authority in the MFDC. The British experience in Northern Ireland provides good lessons in negotiating with the insurgent leaders. “As the peace process evolved, there was a danger that the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) would fracture into multiple insurgent groups, each of which would have to be dealt with separately.” They empowered the leadership to maintain an influential party to negotiate with.³⁴

In sum, the Senegalese government did a poor job in addressing the Political LLO at the beginning and during the conflict. Since 2000 a more intelligent approach has been adopted, but more effort has to be done to efficiently address the Politics/Governance LLO. From that analysis, the values in Table 2 are assigned to qualify the Politics/Governance LLO of Senegal at the beginning, during and at the end of the COIN campaign.

Liberia

Samuel Doe's Political LLO was compromised before Charles Taylor's offensive. First, after he had killed Tolbert's son, he added two years to his age to meet the age requirement of the Liberian constitution.³⁵ In addition, to legitimize his power, he repressed all his political opponents and put them in jail. Among them was the current president of Liberia Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. He consolidated his legitimacy with unfair and undemocratic elections in 1985. His vice president admitted later in 1990 that they had cheated.³⁶ After the failed coup conducted by Quiwonkpa on November 1985, Doe adopted a repressive strategy.

When Charles Taylor started his offensive, Samuel Doe underestimated the threat and opted for a heavy handed strategy. By the time he realized that he was losing the popular contest and, moreover, the military struggle, it was too late. "He released the political prisoners, unbanned political parties, deproscribed some newspapers, increased civil service salaries, and promised free and fair elections in 1991."³⁷

In total, Liberia's government did not address properly the Political LLO at all, at the beginning, during and the end of the COIN campaign. From that analysis, the values in Table 2 are assigned to qualify the Politics/Governance LLO of Liberia at the beginning, during and at the end of the COIN campaign.

Cote d'Ivoire

The political turmoil in Cote d'Ivoire started with Bédié. He made electoral reforms to exclude his rival, Ouatarara, from running for president and changed the constitution. When Gueï came to office after the coup of December 1999, the

expectations to address the contentious point of Bedie's reforms were high. He did worse than his predecessor. When Gueï seized power on 24 December 1999, he immediately suspended the constitution. A referendum was held on 23 July and a new, "even harsher constitution was voted in." The new constitution, not only allowed Gueï to run for president, but denied Ouattara the right to run for president. "For the first time in the country's history, organizations were set up, as they were in South Africa, to defend the rights of half-castes."³⁸

To deal with the growing insurgency, President Gbagbo organized a forum of national reconciliation in Abidjan. Seydou Diarra, prime minister under Gueï's junta, was the chair, and from 9 October 2001 to 12 December 2001, political parties, trade-unions, the armed forces, the police, social forces and religious institutions sent delegations to the forum to express their grievances and address the Ivorian crisis at its roots. Ouattara's nationality and the constitution were the central questions, but Gbagbo ignored the main recommendations for reconciliation. He simply met with Bédié, Ouattara and Gueï and promised them amnesty measures to exonerate them from blame and provided them with lifelong allowances.³⁹ "The situation in Côte d'Ivoire became even more unstable after the forum, with perilous complications arising from the security forces that triggered army mutinies in 2001 and 2002."⁴⁰

In total, the government tried to tackle the Political LLO, but failed during the whole campaign. From that analysis, the values in Table 2 are assigned to qualify the Politics/Governance LLO of Côte d'Ivoire at the beginning, during and at the end of the COIN campaign.

Table 10. Politics/Governance LLO (value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	end
Senegal	-2.25	-1.75	0.75
Liberia	-4	-3.5	-1.75
Cote d'Ivoire	-3.5	-3.25	-2.75

Findings

In the field of politics and governance, all three countries have negative marks. This reveals a need in the sub region to address those issues. Senegal benefited from a democratic regime change and was able to make positive steps during and at the end of the Campaign. Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire did not perform in that field and lost their fight.

Economic Development

Senegal

The most affected area by an insurgency is the border region with neighboring countries. "Peasants living in borderlands buy and sell on the side of the boundary where the prices are a bit better, or where supplies are available from local business."⁴¹ The populations living in the border region are isolated from the rest of the Casamance region. As a result, they primarily deal economically with their neighboring countries. Even administratively, the populations near the Gambia border have Gambian identification cards. They vote during Gambian elections and send their kids to Gambian schools. The Senegalese government is trying to help them by demining the region and opening some roads. Some schools have also been opened and a free meal is given to the

students. Those efforts, although good, are far from satisfying the needs of the locals. They need better transportation networks to develop small local businesses. The road network condition, in addition to the potential lack of security, does not encourage merchants to go there and buy the local farmers' agricultural products. Because of the weak local economy, many people have shifted, voluntarily or forced by the insurgents, to illicit crops like marihuana.

Since 2001, Senegal has established a program to revitalize the economic activities in Casamance. The plan called PRAESC (Programme de Reliance des Activites Economiques et Sociales en Casamance) was estimated to be budgeted at \$133,660,000.⁴² The effectiveness of that plan is jeopardized by many factors discussed previously at the Politics/Governance LLO: greed, incompetence and so on. From that analysis, the values in Table 3 are assigned to qualify the Economic LLO of Senegal at the beginning, during and at the end of the COIN campaign.

Liberia

Liberia's government was unable to address the economic LLO during the insurgency. By 1984, U.S. private investment in Liberia was the third largest in Africa.⁴³ Moreover, by 1986, Washington provided a third of Liberia's total revenue.⁴⁴ Doe lost all that support partly because of the end of the Cold War, but also because of governance issues. Doe's poor governance led the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1986 to deny Liberia access to its special drawing rights for defaulting on a \$900 million debt. A decrease of 25 percent of government jobs and salaries resulted from that. The World Bank stopped loans to Liberia the same year.⁴⁵ All these measures justified the need for a

lot of effort in the economic LLO. Unfortunately, Liberia's government, having lost all external support, was no longer able to address its economic issues.

In total Liberia's government was not able to provide the economic relief needed to regain the support of the population. From that analysis, the values in Table 3 are assigned to qualify the Economic LLO of Liberia at the beginning, during and at the end of the COIN campaign.

Cote d'Ivoire

Cote d'Ivoire's economy started deteriorating under Bédié. Political repression and economic corruption led the IMF and the European Union (EU) to suspend aid to the country.⁴⁶ After the 1999 coup, the economy fell into recession in 2000 and the GDP recorded a growth of -2.3 percent.⁴⁷ The ability of the government to address the economic LLO was therefore limited. It was vital to address it, because the northern part of Cote d'Ivoire had experienced severe socio-economic inequalities. Five of the six regions that scored lowest on this socio-economic indicator were located in the northern part of Côte d'Ivoire.⁴⁸

The Cote d'Ivoire government did not correctly address the economic LLO prior to the conflict. The exponential escalation of the conflict denied it of any chance to realize the benefits from it. From that analysis, the values in Table 3 are assigned to qualify the Economic LLO of Côte d'Ivoire at the beginning, during and at the end of the COIN campaign.

Table 11. Recapitulative of the Economic Development LLO
(value range: -5 to +5).

	beginning	during	end
Senegal	-2.25	-0.75	1
Liberia	-2.75	-3	-1
Cote d'Ivoire	-2.5	-2.5	-1.75

Findings

The governments of Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire were not able to make sufficient progress in the economic LLO, which caused them to not be able to control their insurgencies. Senegal, on the other hand, had taken this LLO in consideration and was able to make some improvements. This reduced or at least stopped the influence of the MFDC in the Casamance Region.

Information Operations

Senegal

In Senegal, the Casamance conflict was not openly discussed in public. The government did not have any theme to influence the local population to influence them to deny their support to the insurgents. Many examples of insurgents' misdeeds and atrocities could have been used. The insurgents had looted many villages and raped many girls. They had chased many people from their farms. In addition, they forced many peasants to grow illicit crops. In sum, there are many themes that could have been used by the Government to discredit the insurgents and weaken their cause. Because of the

government's reluctance to release information regarding the Casamance, it forced the private media to rely on speculations and half truths. The station "Sud FM Ziguinchor", for example, delivers mostly unfavorable information on the government's COIN activities. The government is trying to influence the population through various channels, such as political and cultural activities, but there is no apparent synchronization with a coordinated COIN strategy. There are no press imbedded with the government's COIN forces, and even the Armed Forces information unit did not have a coherent communications strategy. The insurgents seemed to have more of a clear understanding of the importance of the use of information. The Casamance insurgents have conducted interviews with the Sud FM radio station and Radio France Internationale which have been widely listened by the Casamance populace.

Overall, the Senegalese government did an acceptable job in gaining intelligence. It did not have a coherent plan to influence the population at the beginning and during the conflict. It seems to understand now the importance of information, but there is still a lot to be done. From that analysis, the values in Table 4 are assigned to qualify the Information Operations LLO of Senegal at the beginning, during and at the end of the COIN campaign.

Liberia

In the field of gathering intelligence, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) failed mostly because the NPFL started its insurgency in the Nimba County where the government was unpopular. Doe's government arbitrarily arrested and tortured the

population to collect intelligence. This increased their unpopularity, and they lost total support of the population. Neither did they do a good job in influencing the Liberians.

Charles Taylor excelled in influencing both the Liberians and international opinion. He called them with his satellite phone to pass his information operation (IO) message.⁴⁹ He also welcomed CNN reporters to discredit Doe in the international scene.⁵⁰ The government IO campaign was not good enough to counter the NPFL. Doe progressively lost international support. Even the Nigerian president, who actively supported him, abandoned him and later called for his resignation.⁵¹

In sum, Doe's government was overwhelmed by insurgents' IO. The exactions Doe conducted on the basis of ethnic origins affected negatively the Liberian population. That terror-based IO strategy denied him all support from the contested population. From that analysis, the values in Table 4 are assigned to qualify the Information Operations LLO of Liberia at the beginning, during and at the end of the COIN campaign.

Cote d'Ivoire

In regards to gaining intelligence, the government forces did a very poor job. They underestimated the insurgents' forces at the beginning of the conflict. The insurgents were better organized and better equipped than the government thought. When Gbagbo came to office, he got rid of everyone he thought was close to Gueï. His defense minister, Lida Kouassi, also unilaterally removed northern officers thought to be close to Ouattara's party and replaced them in Bouaké with southerners.⁵² Because of lack of intelligence, he committed a lot of mistakes and got fired. The ability of the government to collect valuable intelligence was undermined by the fact that many officers who joined

the insurgency occupied key positions during Gueï's administration, and therefore knew very well how the government operated.

On the other hand, instead of influencing the northern population in order to deny their support to the insurgents, the Cote d'Ivoire government conducted a very nationalistic IO campaign that turned many southern Ivorians to an increased sense of xenophobia. This had a galvanizing effect in the northern population to support the insurgency. In addition, on 27 October 2000, pictures of a mass grave found in Yopougon were published and Gbagbo's government started to lose its international credibility.⁵³

In total, the Cote d'Ivoire government did a very bad job either of gaining intelligence or influencing the northern population to win their support. From that analysis, the values in Table 4 are assigned to qualify the Information Operations LLO of Côte d'Ivoire at the beginning, during and at the end of the COIN campaign.

Table 12. Use of Information in COIN Campaigns (value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	end
Senegal	-2.75	-0.75	0.25
Liberia	-3.25	-2.5	-2.25
Cote d'Ivoire	-3	-2.25	-2

Findings

The information LLO was not seriously taken into consideration in the three countries. All three countries focused more on gaining intelligence than influencing the population. The result in Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia was a total loss of influence of

government forces in the contested area with the insurgency. Senegal, on the other hand, began with a poor IO campaign, but improved it during the rest of the COIN campaign.

Combat Operations/Civil Security Operations

Senegal

The Senegalese police forces include the Police and the Gendarmerie. The Gendarmerie is placed under the responsibility of the Minister of Armed Forces, like the Army, but the Police are under the responsibility of the Minister of Interior. Both Police and Gendarmerie deal primarily with all issues inside the national territory, while the Army normally deals only with the threat coming from outside. The Police and the Gendarmerie's areas of responsibility often overlap. Each of them has a territorial element that is permanently deployed in a certain area, and a mobile element that is used as a quick reaction force. In a COIN campaign, the territorial police, who have a good knowledge of their area of responsibility, are the most effective in collecting human intelligence.

When the insurgency began in Casamance, the Senegalese government, instead of developing the local police, sent in the mobile police forces into the region. Those mobile police forces were quickly overwhelmed and the military had to intervene. Instead of supporting the police to fight the insurgents, the military became in charge. During the conflict, the Casamance region was considered a war zone. The police forces withdrew from rural area and the military forces steadily increased their presence. The military were conducting police operations for which they had not been trained. Currently, the military forces are still in charge. The police are regaining control of some of the area,

but very slowly. In addition, police forces do not consider themselves COIN forces; therefore, instead of taking the lead, they exit most of the area, since to them it appears more like a war zone.

This military oriented approach, adopted by Senegal to deal with the insurgents, led the government to a very heavy-handed strategy at the beginning of the conflict. The contest for the hearts and minds of the population were lost at the very outset. They quickly supported the insurgents who were part of them. In total, the COIN strategy adopted by Senegal was lethally oriented at the beginning of the conflict. The dead bodies of insurgents were displayed on the national television for deterrence purposes. The result of that lethal policy was the opposite of the expected one: MFDC armed wing, Attika, grew quickly in terms of recruits and weapons, the international community started to point out human right issues in Casamance, and Gambia and Guinea Bissau started to actively support actively the insurgents.

With the democratic transition in 2000, the new government adopted a less lethal approach which was explained in the political and diplomatic LLOs. From that analysis, the values in Table 5 are assigned to qualify the Combat/Civil Security Operations LLO of Senegal at the beginning, during and at the end of the COIN campaign.

Liberia

When Quiwonkpa's coup failed in 1985, Liberian President Samuel Doe knew that there was a threat to his power. "After foiling the attempted coup, Doe's Krahn-dominated soldiers went on a rampage in Nimba County, indiscriminately killing a reported 3,000 Gios and Manos and burning their villages."⁵⁴ Many fled away in

neighboring countries. Nimba County is the most densely populated county in Liberia and is located at the border with Cote d'Ivoire.⁵⁵ This misuse of lethal forces set the stage for exploitation of ethnic rivalry which was exploited by the insurgents afterwards.

When the NFPL started with the 1989 the invasion from Cote d'Ivoire, the Liberian Army exacted collective punishments on the population in Nimba County out of frustration at not being able to get the highly mobile rebels. "The soldiers moved from village to village, shooting at the inhabitants indiscriminately, looting the properties and burning huts and houses, carrying out scorched earth policies." ⁵⁶

Six hundred mostly Gio and Mano civilians sheltering in Monrovia's St. Peter's Lutheran Church were machine-gunned to death by AFL soldiers in July 1990, including the father of NPFL warlord Charles Taylor.⁵⁷

This lethal strategy had very bad consequences, internally and externally. Inside the country, many of the terrorized population joined the insurgent cause. Taylor's forces increased very quickly and gained more support from the Liberian population. Externally, Doe's regime started losing credibility, therefore facilitating external support for the insurgents. Instead of isolating the insurgents, the Liberian government had isolated itself. Two U.S. Army advisors who were assisting the government forces withdrew when they realized the atrocities committed by Doe's soldiers.⁵⁸

In total, the Liberian COIN strategy under President Doe was too lethal and heavy-handed, at the beginning, during and at the end of the campaign. From that analysis, the values in Table 5 are assigned to qualify the Combat/Civil Security Operations LLO of Liberia at the beginning, during and at the end of the COIN campaign.

Cote d'Ivoire

Cote d'Ivoire had a very heavy handed approach at the beginning of the insurgency. The government tried to use terror to threaten and punish the population. It was accused of the Yopougon massacre on 26 October 2000 and the Bouaké massacre on 6 October 2002.

All the victims of this massacre belonged to the *Dioula* ethnic group, a name often used to describe Côte d'Ivoire nationals from the north of the country, and with Muslim names. This term is also sometimes used to describe nationals of neighboring countries, especially those from Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea.⁵⁹

Because of this very lethal strategy, Cote d'Ivoire quickly lost the support of the Northern population.

This strategy legitimized and strengthened the cause of the insurgency, which quickly found support in the neighboring countries. The difficulty of the Cote d'Ivoire government to deal with security issues, started under Gueï's junta. To expand the security forces, Gueï recruited, in 1999-2000, young soldiers, many of them according to their ethnic affiliation, to form special paramilitary units known as *Zinzins* and *Bahéfoués*.⁶⁰ With the help of President Taylor of Liberia, Gueï recruited a number of Liberian and Sierra Leonean fighters for his presidential guard, known as the Red Brigades.⁶¹ Under the Gbagbo regime, the members of the *Cosa Nostra*, *Zinzins* and *Bahéfoués* units considered to be too close to Gueï, were demobilized. Gbagbo bought new arms, recruited ethnic militias and paramilitary forces and mobilized thousands of southern youths with the help of student organizations. Moreover, he supported the ultra-nationalist youth movement called *Alliance des jeunes patriotes pour le sursaut national* and known as 'Young Patriots.' Finally, to stop the advance of the insurgents, Gbagbo's

government resorted to European, South African and Angolan mercenaries.⁶² The COIN approach of Cote d'Ivoire's government is not very different from Doe's strategy in Liberia. From that analysis, the values in Table 5 are assigned to qualify the Combat/Civil Security Operations LLO of Côte d'Ivoire at the beginning, during and at the end of the COIN campaign.

Table 13. Combat and Civil Security Operations (value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Senegal	-2	-2	-1.25
Liberia	-3.75	-3.25	-3.25
Cote d'Ivoire	-3.5	-3.5	-3.75

Findings

All three countries had adopted an over militarized and lethal strategy at the beginning of the insurgency. This was a failure. They made their insurgencies grow instead of eliminating them. Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire, with highest scores, had collapsed under the pressure of the insurgency. Those two countries had also targeted innocent people because of their ethnic identity. Overall, a lethal approach does not seem to work in West Africa because it is easy for the insurgents to use it as a propaganda tool against the government.

Conclusion

The analysis of the five LLOs, Diplomacy, Politic/Governance, Economic, Information and Combat/security Operations, has tried to provide an appreciation of how good or bad Senegal, Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire did in addressing those LLOs during their respective COIN campaign. The resulting analysis clearly indicates that there is a need for West African countries to readjust their COIN strategies. Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire collapsed under the pressure of the insurgents. Thanks to ECOMOG and UN peace keeping forces, those countries are stabilizing. Senegal is still struggling against the MFDC. It has made some progress lately. Nevertheless, the threat of resurging insurgencies is real in the whole region of West Africa. Chapter five will propose a better COIN strategy to face that threat.

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³Ibid., 18.

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⁵Ibid.

⁶<http://www.iit.edu/~it/delphi.html> (accessed 5 June 2009).

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⁹Ibid., 24.

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²⁰*Ibid.*

²¹*Ibid.*

²²FM 3-24, 6-19.

²³Diop, 199.

²⁴*Ibid.*, 135.

²⁵*Ibid.*, 199.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 203.

²⁷*Ibid.*, 60.

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³⁰Langer Arnim, *Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Conflict: The Case of Côte d'Ivoire*, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) Working Paper No. 13 November 2004, 11.

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³⁴Marston Daniel and Carter Malkasian *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 184.

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⁵²Diallo, 15.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid., 29, 30.

⁵⁵Isabelle Duyvesteyn, *Clausewitz and African War: Politics and Strategy in Liberia and Somalia* (New York: Frank Cass, 2005), 24.

⁵⁶Ibid., 27.

⁵⁷Adekeye Adebajo, 43.

⁵⁸Duyvesteyn, 27.

⁵⁹<http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=3C14E24F5016D2BF80256CDE00483BA9> (accessed 27 April 2009)

⁶⁰Diallo, 13.

⁶¹C. Ero, and A. Marshall. L'Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire: un conflit libérien? In *Politique Africaine* 89 (2003): 88-101.

⁶²Diallo, 13.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMANDATIONS

Introduction

This final chapter will draw some recommendations from the analysis made in the previous chapter. The opportunity will be seized to propose some guidance for a more effective COIN strategy in West Africa. The guidance will focus on the non lethal LLOs. Finally, the study will propose a regional approach to mobilize sub-regional resources to eradicate the insurgencies.

COIN Approach

First of all it is the time to point out that during the whole research, any written document that describes the COIN strategy of the counties studied has never been found. This might mean that they never really had one. A COIN campaign is a very complex joint operation. It requires the mobilization, of civilian, military and paramilitary resources. This diversity in resources goes along with various and complex actions that need to be coordinated, synchronized and driven by an overarching coherent strategy. Because West African countries focus on repressing the insurgents and the population that support them, they neglect all non lethal LLO which are vital to a COIN campaign. The COIN strategy this study proposes is based on transformation. The aim of the government should not be to eliminate the insurgents, but to transform the physical and human environment to a point that the insurgency will no longer be able to survive. This transformation strategy requires a lot of patience and perseverance.

The primary focus of the government should be to address the root causes of the insurgency. Most insurgencies think that the long duration of the conflict plays to their favor. In the long run, they get more legitimacy, and the COIN forces will get exhausted. This is not the case if the government properly conducts its COIN campaign. By properly addressing the grievances of the population, the cause of the insurgent will fade progressively and will ultimately no longer be relevant. Attacking the root causes of the insurgency being the primary focus of the government, the main effort should be the non lethal LLOs. The following lines will expose some suggestions resulting from the analysis of the five LLOs in Chapter Four.

Diplomacy

Chapter four has shown that maintaining good diplomatic relations with neighboring countries is critical in fighting an insurgency. West African countries tend to accuse their neighbors of supporting the insurgents. This worsens the already fragile diplomatic relations with the neighbors, and facilitates them to more openly support the insurgents. The government must keep in mind that, in order to isolate the insurgents and deny them external support, it must convince the international opinion, in general, and its neighbors in particular, to take its side or at least not to take a side. Any action that might turn a neighboring country to the insurgents' side should be avoided. In fact, the contest of the hearts and minds does not apply only to the local population, but also to the international opinion. For example, Guinea Bissau was suspected of supporting the Casamance insurgents. When Senegal reestablished good relations with Bissau, the latter

was no longer able to openly support the MFDC. The Bissau government ended up destroying the bases that the insurgents had previously established in its territory.

Political/Governance

Since “a COIN strategy is only as good as the political plan at its heart,”¹ the Political LLO should be the backbone of the government strategy. In other terms, the ends, ways and means of the COIN campaign should be determined by the Political LLO. The government has to elaborate a political plan that clearly defines, integrates and coordinates the missions of all the components of the COIN campaign. That overarching plan will guide all the actions, lethal or non lethal.

Targeting the insurgents’ elite to give them their “part of the cake” is not a good strategy at all. It is just reestablishing a *patrimonialistic* system. The focus of the government should be the people. Transparency and good governance are vital for political stability. Without those two, the government will not have any credibility and therefore any legitimacy in the eyes of the contested population. In addition, it will not be either a reliable party to negotiate with in the eyes of the insurgents.

For governance issues, West African countries have to build the institutions required to minimize corruption and bad governance. As long as those institutions are not established, there will always be room for bad behavior of the leaders that compromise any political stability.

Economic

The economic LLO goes along with the political and the governance piece. In West Africa, insurgencies mostly occur in an area where they can find resources to

sustain themselves. This means that there is a potential for the government to develop those areas. By developing local economic activities, the government will address some grievances of the population. In addition, the governments should build paved road networks to make most areas easily accessible. An economically prosperous region, easy to access, will certainly attract people from the other parts of the country. The local population will therefore have more interaction and more interdependence vis-a-vis the rest of the population of the country. In the long run, this will encourage them to be active participants. Moreover, this population movement from other parts of the country to the insurgency area will dilute the original local population, and therefore reduce the sense of ethnic or regional belonging.

Information

The information LLO is the most neglected by West African governments during their COIN campaign. They focus mostly on gaining intelligence but forget to influence the people. For a transformation strategy, influencing the population is key for the COIN campaign. Every single action must be guided by the purpose to influence positively the population. Just killing the insurgents who are part of the population does not seem to get the desired effect. It must be the last resort. By killing or torturing an insurgent, the government is more likely to transform all his family and his ethnic group into insurgents. The sense of the family is very developed in West Africa and people tend to support a family member no matter what he does.

For the ongoing COIN campaign in Casamance, the Senegalese government should lay out a strategy to influence the next generation. The secessionist grievances

should be weakened and the pride of being Senegalese developed through various government programs.

Combat Operations and Security Forces

This transformation strategy does not advocate the non use of military forces. The government must have military forces that guarantee success during combat operations. The cases of Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia are good examples. Because military forces were overwhelmed by the insurgents, neither Doe nor Gbagbo could properly address the non lethal LLOs. Success of military forces in combat operations is a necessary condition to the other LLOs. Without a secured environment, it is impossible to effectively develop non lethal LLOs. Therefore, the government should maintain capable and professional military forces. The COIN environment requires a well trained and well equipped military force that guaranty success when engaging the insurgents with minimal collateral damages.

The use of military for a COIN operation is secondary. The primary force for COIN operations is the police. The police must have the main effort and the military the shaping one. This requires West African countries to build more capabilities for their police forces. The lack of qualified personnel and appropriate equipment leads police forces to overuse violent and lethal means. Their repressive strategy easily turns the population and the international opinion against the government.

The recommendation made for each of those LLO should be applied by each country in West Africa. Yet, this does not guarantee any success at all. Most of the West African countries are very small, have limited resources and are very vulnerable. Only a

broader and integrated regional approach will make it possible to decisively defeat the insurgencies in West Africa.

Regional approach

The analysis of the diplomatic relationships between the country affected by the insurgency and its immediate neighbors shows that good relationship with other countries matters. The artificial borders inherited from the colonial era do not reflect the socio-ethnological map in West Africa. The existence of identical ethnic groups across the neighboring countries contributes to the prolongation of the conflicts and to complex population displacements. In Liberia, the Mandingo and Krahn ethnic groups from Lofa County have strong ethnic affinity with identical groups in Guinea and Sierra Leone. There is also an ethnic affinity between the same groups in the southwest of Côte d'Ivoire and the eastern part of Liberia. In Côte d'Ivoire the biggest part of the northern population originates from Burkina Faso and Mali. ² In Senegal also there is a strong ethnic tie between the insurgents and the population in the southern part of Gambia and those in the northern part of Guinea Bissau. This incompatibility between the physical borders and the ethnic ones makes it easier for the insurgents to operate along the borders. Social and economic deprivation characterizes the instability in the sub-region. The lack of opportunity makes it easy for the insurgents to recruit in the entire sub-region.

The Casamance insurgency would hardly survive a good military and police cooperation between Senegal and its neighbors. For example, when Guinea Bissau decided to no longer provide safe heaven to the insurgents, they were obliged to move their bases to the northern border with the Gambia republic.

The involvement of Cote d'Ivoire in the Liberian civil war might be one of the reasons that the country was quickly destabilized. In addition, the permanent instability in the sub-region has given birth to a lot of mercenaries and foreign fighters who are eagerly attracted by destabilized areas, primarily for looting purposes. Among the Cote d'Ivoire insurgents were mercenaries from Burkina Faso and from the Mano River Union Region (Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea).³ With a close look to the Cote d'Ivoire case, close attention should be devoted to Burkina Faso. Like Cote d'Ivoire, this country has been involved in many insurgencies in West Africa. The transition from the current Burkinabe regime to the next one might be destabilizing, especially if the conflicts in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire are not decisively resolved.

It is almost impossible for any country in West Africa to have complete control of its borders. The cooperation between neighboring countries becomes vital to develop a global strategy to secure the borders. Charles Taylor recruited nationals of other West African countries and promised to support them for struggles in their home states. In that regard, he supported the formation of a rebel group in Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) which destabilized that country.⁴ The already existing ECOWAS, and its military component ECOMOG, can be used as a basis to develop global security cooperation with all security forces. Finally, a regional approach will deny the insurgents safe bases and easy available military equipment.

Recommendations for Future Studies

Further studies might inquire how to build regional capabilities to strengthen border security in West Africa. Along with insurgencies, this region is facing many other

issues such as drug trafficking and small arms smuggling. In this era of globalization, regional cooperation is vital for West African countries to be able to deal with the current powerful non state actors.

¹Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide*, January 2009, 3.

²<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/ffd7a88bb538f8e0c1256a18005929f4> (accessed 27 April 2009).

³Ero and Marshall, 88-101.

⁴Duyvesteyn, 24.

APPENDIX A

BLANK COPY OF SURVEY SUBMITTED TO SERVEY RESPONDENTS

Diplomatic Relationships between Senegal and its Neighbors (value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Guinea Bissau			
Gambia			
Mauritania			
Mali			
Republic of Guinea			
Average			

Diplomatic Relationships between Liberia and its Neighbors (value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Cote d'Ivoire			
Republic of Guinea			
Sierra Leone			
Average			

Diplomatic Relationships between Cote d'Ivoire and its Neighbors
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Liberia			
Republic of Guinea			
Ghana			
Mali			
Burkina Faso			
Average			

Recapitulative Table for the 3 Countries for the Diplomatic LLO
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	end
Senegal			
Liberia			
Cote d'Ivoire			

Politics/Governance LLO (value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	end
Senegal			
Liberia			
Cote d'Ivoire			

Recapitulative of the Economic Development LLO (value range: -5 to +5).

	beginning	during	end
Senegal			
Liberia			
Cote d'Ivoire			

Use of Information in COIN Campaigns (value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	end
Senegal			
Liberia			
Cote d'Ivoire			

Combat and Civil Security Operations (value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Senegal			
Liberia			
Cote d'Ivoire			

APPENDIX B

RATING OF THE DIFFERENT VARIABLES FOR THE THREE CASES BY OFFICER X₁

Table 14. Diplomatic Relationships between Senegal and its Neighbors
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Guinea Bissau	-2	-4	-1
Gambia	4	1	-3
Mauritania	-1	-3	3
Mali	1	1	2
Republic of Guinea	1	1	2
Average	0.6	-0.8	0.6

Table 15. Diplomatic Relationships between Liberia and its Neighbors
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Cote d'Ivoire	-3	-5	-4
Republic of Guinea	1	2	0
Sierra Leone	-2	-2	-2
Average	-1.3	-1.7	-2

Table 16. Diplomatic Relationships between Cote d'Ivoire and its Neighbors
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Liberia	-2	-1	0
Republic of Guinea	-2	-3	-2
Ghana	0	0	0
Mali	-2	-3	-2
Burkina Faso	-2	-3	-2
Average	-1.6	-2	-1.2

Table 17. Recapitulative Table for the 3 Countries for the Diplomatic LLO
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	end
Senegal	0.6	-0.8	0.6
Liberia	-1.3	-1.7	-2
Cote d'Ivoire	-1.6	-2	-1.2

Table 18. Politics/Governance LLO (value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	end
Senegal	-1	-1	3
Liberia	-4	-3	-1
Cote d'Ivoire	-3	-4	-4

Table 19. Recapitulative of the Economic Development LLO
(value range: -5 to +5).

	beginning	during	end
Senegal	-2	1	3
Liberia	-3	-4	-1
Cote d'Ivoire	-3	-3	-3

Table 20. Use of Information in COIN Campaigns
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	end
Senegal	-2	1	3
Liberia	-2	-2	-3
Cote d'Ivoire	-2	-2	-2

Table 21. Combat and Civil Security Operations
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Senegal	2	-2	-4
Liberia	-3	-3	-4
Cote d'Ivoire	-3	-3	-4

APPENDIX C

RATING OF THE DIFFERENT VARIABLES FOR THE THREE CASES BY OFFICER X₂

Table 22. Diplomatic Relationships between Senegal and its Neighbors
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Guinea Bissau	-1	-2	2
Gambia	-2	-1	2
Mauritania	-1	1	3
Mali	2	3	3
Republic of Guinea	2	3	3
Average	0	0.8	2.6

Table 23. Diplomatic Relationships between Liberia and its Neighbors
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Cote d'Ivoire	-3	-3	-2
Republic of Guinea	-1	-1	1
Sierra Leone	-3	-1	1
Average	-2.3	-1.7	0

Table 24. Diplomatic Relationships between Cote d'Ivoire and its Neighbors
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Liberia	-3	-1	-2
Republic of Guinea	-2	-1	0
Ghana	-1	2	3
Mali	-1	-2	-3
Burkina Faso	-1	-3	-3
Average	-1.6	-1	-1

Table 25. Recapitulative table for the 3 Countries for the Diplomatic LLO
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	end
Senegal	0	0.8	2.6
Liberia	-2.3	-1.7	0
Cote d'Ivoire	-1.6	-1	-1

Table 26. Politics/Governance LLO (value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	end
Senegal	-2	-1	-1
Liberia	-4	-3	-2
Cote d'Ivoire	-3	-2	-2

Table 27. Recapitulative of the Economic Development LLO
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Senegal	-2	-2	1
Liberia	-1	-2	0
Cote d'Ivoire	-1	-1	0

Table 28. Use of Information in COIN Campaigns
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	end
Senegal	-3	-1	-1
Liberia	-3	-2	-1
Cote d'Ivoire	-3	-2	-2

Table 29. Combat and Civil Security Operations
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Casamance	-3	-2	-1
Liberia	-3	-2	-1
Cote d'Ivoire	-3	-2	-2

APPENDIX D:

RATING OF THE DIFFERENT VARIABLES FOR THE THREE CASES BY

OFFICER X₃

Table 30. Diplomatic Relationships between Senegal and its Neighbors
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Guinea Bissau	1	-2	1
Gambia	5	-2	0
Mauritania	3	-3	3
Mali	3	3	3
Republic of Guinea	2	0	2
Average	2.8	-0.8	1.8

Table 31. Diplomatic Relationships between Liberia and its Neighbors
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Cote d'Ivoire	-3	-3	-2
Republic of Guinea	3	2	3
Sierra Leone	-4	-4	3
Average	-1.3	-1.7	1.3

Table 32. Diplomatic Relationships between Cote d'Ivoire and its Neighbors
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Liberia	-3	-3	-3
Republic of Guinea	3	3	3
Ghana	3	3	3
Mali	-2	-3	-2
Burkina Faso	-3	-4	-2
Average	-0.4	-0.8	-0.2

Table 33. Recapitulative Table for the 3 Countries for the Diplomatic LLO
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	end
Senegal	2.8	-0.8	1.8
Liberia	-1.3	-1.7	1.3
Cote d'Ivoire	-0.4	-0.8	-0.2

Table 34. Politics/Governance LLO (value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	end
Senegal	-2	-3	2
Liberia	-4	-4	-1
Cote d'Ivoire	-4	-4	-2

Table 35. Recapitulative of the Economic Development LLO
(value range: -5 to +5).

	beginning	during	end
Senegal	-2	0	1
Liberia	-3	-2	0
Cote d'Ivoire	-3	-2	0

Table 36. Use of Information in COIN campaigns (value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	end
Senegal	-2	-1	0
Liberia	-3	-2	-1
Cote d'Ivoire	-3	-2	-1

Table 37. Combat and Civil Security Operations (value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Senegal	-3	-2	1
Liberia	-4	-3	-3
Cote d'Ivoire	-4	-4	-4

APPENDIX E:

RATING OF THE DIFFERENT VARIABLES FOR THE

THREE CASES BY OFFICER X₄

Table 38. Diplomatic Relationships between Senegal and its Neighbors
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Guinea Bissau	-4	-1	+3
Gambia	+5	-1	-2
Mauritania	-2	-5	0
Mali	0	0	0
Republic of Guinea	0	0	0
Average	-0.2	-1.4	0.2

Table 39. Diplomatic Relationships between Liberia and its Neighbors
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Cote d'Ivoire	-4	-4	-4
Republic of Guinea	+1	0	-1
Sierra Leone	-1	-1	-1
Average	-1.3	-1.7	-2

Table 40. Diplomatic Relationships between Cote d'Ivoire and its Neighbors
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Liberia	-1	-4	-4
Republic of Guinea	-1	-1	-1
Ghana	0	0	0
Mali	-3	-3	-3
Burkina Faso	-4	-5	-5
Average	-1.8	-2.6	-2.6

Table 41. Recapitulative Table for the 3 Countries for the Diplomatic LLO
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	end
Senegal	-0.2	-1.4	0.2
Liberia	-1.3	-1.7	-2
Cote d'Ivoire	-1.8	-2.6	-2.6

Table 42. Politics/Governance LLO (value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	end
Senegal	-4	-2	-1
Liberia	-4	-4	-3
Cote d'Ivoire	-4	-3	-3

Table 43. Recapitulative of the Economic Development LLO
(value range: -5 to +5).

	beginning	during	end
Senegal	-3	-2	-1
Liberia	-4	-4	-3
Cote d'Ivoire	-3	-4	-4

Table 44. Use of Information in COIN Campaigns
(value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	end
Senegal	-4	-2	-1
Liberia	-5	-4	-4
Cote d'Ivoire	-4	-3	-3

Table 45. Combat and Civil Security Operations (value range: -5 to +5).

	Beginning	During	End
Senegal	-4	-2	-1
Liberia	-5	-5	-5
Cote d'Ivoire	-4	-5	-5

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